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Radical  change in the land reform program is not in order in
Mexico,  but certain  institutional  changes  would improve  agri-
cultural  growth  on farmlands  governed  by land  reform.
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Agricultural  Policy
This paper - a joint product of the Agricultural Policy Division, Agriculture and Rural Development
Department, and the Agriculture Operations Division, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office,
Country Department II  - assesses the institutional aspects of agricultural development. Reforms in land
and credit policies, which are the focus of this effort, can have a major impact on both equity and agricul-
tural growth.  Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washing-
ton DC 20433.  Please contact Cicely Spooner, room N8-039, extension 30464 (85 pages with tables).
The ejido is a rural community on which the  *  Simplify and clarify restrictions for private
Mexican government has conferred land and  farmers on holding size and land use.
water resources.  Ejido members (ejidatarios)
can use the land but are prevented by agrarian  *  End restrictions on renting or sharecropping
reform law from selling it.  The ejido seems to  by ejidatarios.
be a more or less fixed element in the Mexican
rural economy.  *  Allow ejidatarios to sell their land parcels
to other members of their ejido (not outsiders).
Heath found no conclusive evidence that
individual. ejidos are significantly less produc-  *  Improve management of communal lands.
tive than private farms, and hence it seems
unlikely that privatization of ejidos would  *  Extend credit directly to individual ejidatar-
greatly improve agricultural growth.  At the  ios, on the basis of their creditworthiness.
margin, however, ejidatarios face more con-
straints on productivity growth than private  *  Cease having the whole ejido bear the
farmers.  burden of loan default by one or more ejidatar-
ios.
Heath recommends the following piecemeal
improvements to the existing structure:  *  Provide credit to ejidatarios wholly in cash
and allow them to decide what inputs to pur-
* Accelerate the drive to give ejidatarios  chase and what crops to plant.
titles to their parcels of land.
* Grant ejidatarios titles irrespective of the
size of their parcels.
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Background
in  Mexico, the  cohmnitment  to  and  reform  Is  enshrined  kI  the  1917
Constitution and the reform remains,  to  this day, an kmportant politieal symbol By
1988, no less than 54 percent of  national territory  had been affected  by the land
reform. The land reform peaked In Intensity  during  the  C6rdenas administration
(135-40)  and, since  the  mid-1970s, there  has  beon a  significant  drop  In the
amount of  land redistrlbuted.  Slnce  1977 governments have often  stated  that
there  Is  no  more lnd  available to  redistrlbute;  emphasis has  shifted  from
redlstrbutlon  to  ensurig  that  landholders (both  within and outside  the  ejido
sector)  have adequate legal title  to  their  land. Although expansion of  the  land
reform sector  Is not  part  of  the  present  government's policy agenda, It  derives
a significant  proportion  of  Its  electoral  support  from the  ejido population. Some
have argued that  the ejido  system has  always been of  greater  Importance as  a
polltical control  mechanism  than  as a tool  of  economic policy. In any event,  the
ejldo's political signlficance should not  be underestimated.
Approach
Consideration focusses  on  Individual ejldos  since  these  constitute  the
majority;  collective  ejidos  are  few  In  number and,  since  the  mid-1  970s,  no
govemment has  promoted collectivizatlon. An  attempt  Is  made to  compare the
performance of  Individual farms  Inside the  ejido  with comparably-sized private
farms.  in  Mexico, large  farm  enterprises  have  traditionally  been  favoured  by
government programmes  of  subsidized Input delivery. Therefore,  In reviewing the
historical evidence concerning the relative  efficiency  of  ejidos  and private  farms
It  Is important to  control  for  the scale of  enterprise.
Wherever  possible a comparison  Is made  between ejido parcels of  up to  5
hectares  and  private  farms  In  the  same size  range. According to  the  latest
agricultural census data (1981), roughly 60 percent  of  the farms In both  tenure
categories  are  of  this  size.  Of  the  land In  holdings up  to  five  hectares,  75
pereont Is controlled by ejidos and 25 percent by private farms; the average size
of  farms In the  private  sector  Is 74  hectares,  compared to  7  hectares  In the
ejido sector.
Data Limitations
Comparisons  of  the performance of  both tenure  categories are hampered
by  the  Incompleteness of  the  1981  census  data;  In  many cases  (e.g.  when
comparing crop  yields)  the  most  recent  data  derive  from  the  1970  census.
Therefore, It  Is impossible  to  draw hard and fast  conclusions about  the  relative
productivity  of  private  farms  and  ejidos  in  the  recent  period.  However, by
observing differences In the Institutional arrangements  confronting Individual  ejidos
and private  farms It  Is possible to  Infer  whether such differences  are likely to
lead to  variations In productivity  between the two tenure categories.4
Problems  with the Land Reform Law
Vagueness and contradictions  In the  law create  a climate of  uncertainty
that  may discourage on-farm  investment by both ejidatarios  and private  farmers.
First, whil  there  Is some logic to  estabiishing lknits to  the size of  holdings in the
private farm sector,  the ratinale  for  varying these cellings according to  the type
of  crop  cultivated  Is  dubious. Also,  In  the  case  of  cattle  raising,  the  law Is
Inconsistent about the maxinum  holding  size permitted and there Is a legal ioophole
(amparo) that  has  resulted  In  the  selective  enforcement  of  these  cellings,
undermining  the credibillty of  the  law. Moreover, It  Is unclear what proportin  of
their  land cattle-raisers  may legitknately devote to  crop cultivation  -
The legal stipulation  about  the  size  of  parcels  In  individual ejldos  (20
hectares  of  rainfed  land) Is not  enforceable owing to  demographic  pressure;  in
some cases, ejidatarios  have falled to  recelve title  to  their  holding because the
parcels Is smaller  than the officlally-prescrlbed  minimum.  Although access to  state
credit  appears not  to  be contingent on possession of  title  to  the land, the  lack
of  a  titulo  parcelarlo does  reduce  the  ejldatario's  security  of  tenure:  It  may
Increase the  likelihood of  his being arbitrarily  evicted  If  he falls  out  with  ejido
authorities.
Probably the most Important area of  uncertainty  concerns  the  legitimacy
of  renting-out  ejldo parcels (or engaging In sharecropping). While  Article 76 of  the
1971  Ley  Federal de  Reforma Agrarla may be  interpreted  to  permit  renting  In
certain circumstances, there  Is a noticeable lack of  agreement about the legality
of  this practice.  The 1981 Ley  de Fomento  Agropecuarlo does not  eblfnate  the
confusion:  while facilitating  "iolnt  ventures"  between  ejidatarios  ard  private
farmers It Is not  clear from this law whether forms of  association based on renting
are Illegal.
Access to  Land and Land Use
The fragmentation of  holdings Is only  slightly  less advanced in the  ejido
sector  than among small  private  farms Indicating that,  despite formal prohibitions
on the division of  ejido parcels on Inheritance, the land reform has largely failed
to  check the spread of  minifundia:  on holdings up to  five  hectares,  the average
size of  farms was 2.4 has, In the  ejido sector  and 1.7 has. n the private  sector
(1981). Also, In 1981, In the case of  these small farms, there was no significant
difference  between  tenure  categories  In  the  crop  mix, in  the  proportion  of
cropland left  In fallow and In the number  of  cattle  per hectare.
However, there  were  two  significant  differences  between  the  tenure
categories.  First,  Irrespective  of  holding-size,  the  ejidos  reported  a  higher
Intensity of  land use In 1981 (proportionately  more land In agricultural production).
This may be partly attributable  to  the second factor:  ejidos had better  access to
irrigation  than small private farms (an apparent reversal  of  the pre-1970  trend).
Although the  exact proportion  Is  hard to  determine, a large  part  of  the
land in Individual  ejidos is reserved for  communal  use: primarily  as forest  or rough
grazing. Slnce no Individual  ejidatarlo  feels responsible for  the communal  reserve5
this may  encourage overgrazing and poor forest  management;  If widespread,  these
practices will reduce the  average productivity  of  the ejido  sector  In relation  to
private farms.
Employment
Owing  partly to holding fragmentation, small  farmers and ejidatarlos are not
able to  depend entirely  on the output  of  their  land to  cover  family subsistence
requirements: farmers  in  both  sectors  are  heavilly  Involved In off-farm  work,
seeking employment  In the large towns and also In the United States. Recourse to
off-farm  work has been further  encouraged by urban real wage  trends  which  (until
recently  at  least) have been more favourable than trends  In the farm-gate prices
of  staple crops. Rural  outmigratlon has generally caused (and been a consequence
of)  trends  In agriculture Involving less Intensive use of  labour per hectare. Since
the  19709, these trends  have centred  on more widespread use  of  tractors,  an
Increase In the  relative  Importance of  livestock  Income and a  shift  toward  less
labour-intensive  crops (notably sorghum).
For  ejidatarlos,  the  Increased dependence on  off-farm  income sources
appears to  have led  to  greater  recourse  to  leasing-out  of  ejido  parcels  and
(equally Important) to  sharecropping. As well as placing ejido land In the hands of
private  farmers, these  practices  also  create  employment  within the  ejido  (since
land-deficit  families that  do not  migrate are  able to  work the land of  those who
have migrated):  although, In many  cases, renting and sharecropping Increase wealth
concentration, they may  In some cases have positive distrlbutional effects;  In any
event, they ensure efficient  exploltation of  ejido land by  placing it  In the hands
of  those with the means and the vocatlon to  work It.
Credit
EJldatarlos  have less access than small  private farmers to  commercial  loans
because the  law prevents  them from mortgaging their  land; there  Is therefore  a
long traditlon of  dependence  on state  credit banks that have waived  the collateral
requirement  and, traditionally, exercised weak sanctions against loan default. There
is  a  strong  ethos  of  paternalism and  low  credit  discipline  In  relatlon  to
development  bank lending to  agriculture. This Is a significant point, first,  because
the ethos Is pervasive, affecting  development-bank (Banrural) lending to  private
farmers as well as ejidatarlos; second, because It Is associated with the tendency
to  use  credit  for  political rather  than economic purposes. The second of  these
factors  contributes  to  a tendency to  spread credit  resources  too  thinly: partly
in order  to  enhance rural  tranquility  and partly  from a misguided  attempt to  use
working-capital loans as a means  of  contributing  to  broad-based social welfare.
Patemallsm  Is discernible In the long tradition  of  restricting  the range of
crops for  which state  credit Is available (In effect,  telilng farmers what they may
grow); also, In the  continuing provision of  credit  In kind, with the bank assuming
responsibility  for  selection  and  timely  delivery  of  Inputs.  These  practices
respectively  discourage crop  diversification  (potentlally  restricting  farm Incomes)
and adversely affect  crop  yields by giving the  farmer no freedom to  tailor  Input
application to  his precise requirements.6
Although, In these respects,  ejidatarios  and private  farmers  lending from
Banrural face the same  constraint,  there are two obstacles  to  credit access that
apply specifically to  ejidatarios. First,  IndIvIduals  within the ejido cannot negotiate
directly with Banrural for  their  loans: the bank Is legally required to  operate  with
the ejido as a whole  through the ejido leadership; individual  credit appilcatons must
utimately  be endorsed by  that  leadership. Therefore,  ejidataris  may potentially
be exckided from credit  If  they have political differences  wlth the leadership.
Second, In  the  event  of  default  by  some of  the  ejidatarlos  who have
received  Banrural credit,  the  whol  ejido  may be  cut  off  from  credit  In  the
subsequent  crop  cycles:  ejHdatarlos who repay  their  debts  lose  out  to  the
Irolvency  of  their  feolws.  Since ejldos  tend to  be  large In size and diffuse  In
membership  characteristics,  It  Is rarely  the  case  that  there  Is a -cohesive peer
pressure group capable of  ensuring that  those  tempted to  default  honour their
debts. The probabillty that  the  ejido will be  cut  off  from credit  In the  following
cycle  (coupled  wlth  the  bank's  tolerance  of  Individual defaults)  serves  to
undermine  credit  discipline.
Marketing
A programme  exists that  subsidizes the transport  costs  of  ejidatarlos  and
small private  farmers who sell  grain  to  the  rural  warehouses operated  by  the
state.  While  this programme  may marginally extend the reach of  the government's
guarantee  price  policy,  its  overall  Impact is  restricted  by  the  nature  of  the
warehouse  network: warehouses  are concentrated In better-off  regions (where the
bulk of  the grain surplus Is produced) and there are few of  them In poor, remoter
regions (where the  need for  Income support  Is  greatest).  Therefore,  marketing
subsidles (Ike  credit  subsidies) have  leaked"  to  better-off  farmers,  wasting
resources.
Comparing  the performance of  ejidos and private  farms
From  the preceding discussion, four  hypothese may derived, all tending to
suggest  that  ejidos  should be less productive than private  farms:
1.  Many ejidatarlos  lack  usufruct  title  to  their  land, reducing their
security  of  tenure  and inhibiting on-farm  investment In the  ejido
sector;
2.  Unclear laws  concerning  renting  and  sharecropping  Inhibit  the
transfer  of  land use  to  the most officient  producers;
3.  Mismanagement  of  ejido  communal  land  depresses  the  average
productivity  of  this  sector  In relation  to  private  farms;
4.  Problematic  access of  ejidatarlos to  credit adversely affects  crop
yields.
On the other hand, there  Is a countervailing hypothesis:
5.  Contradictory  laws  concerning  holding-size  likits  and  land-use
restrictions  may Inhibit on-farm  Investment by private farmers.7
Testing of  these hypotheses Is difficult  owing to  data  lnitatlons.  There are  no
recent  studies  of  the  relative  productivity  of  ejidos  and  private  farms:  the
avalable sources are based either on agricultural census data up to  1970 or pre-
1970 case studies. In the period before  1970, ejidos  appear to  have had poorer
and on average than small  private farms and to  have had lesser access to  credit
and public investment; also, there  Is evidence of  scale-blas  In the  government's
dolvery  of  subsidized capital Inputs. These factors  should be borne  In mind In
interpreting  pre-1970  studies.
Sources based on the census record reach varying conchjsions about the
relative productivity  of  the two tenure sectors- summarizing,  It wou  appear that  -
ejidos had lower land yields before  1970 but higher output  per unit of  purchased
capital kiputs;  ejldos also show lower labour productivity  than small private farms,
al  the  more so  If  a cost  Is Imputed to  unpaid family labour. However, given the
clndestine  renting out  of ejido land to private farmers, the census data probably
fall to  reflect  the real distribution of  Inputs and outputs  between the two tenure
sectors;  this places In doubt any concluslons about relative productivity  that  are
derived from the census data.
Of the  case studies, only one  (dating to  1967) controls  effectively  for
both  land tenure  and enterprise  scale:  the  study  concludes that,  In  Irrigated
reglons, ejidos  outperform private  farms in each size stratum  (the gap between
sectors  being largest  In the  case of  capital productivity,  confirming the  results
of  census-based studies).
The Incompleteness  of  the  1981 census data does not  permit calculatlon
of  relative  productivity  In the  recent  period. However, land use  data  from  this
census suggest that ejidos are likely to  be at least as productive as small  private
farms: ejldo parcels  up  to  five  hectares  are  better  Irrigated  than  comparably-
sized private farms and show a higher proportion  of  land in agricultural use; also,
the ratio of  fallow land to  cropland Is the same  for  both tenure categorles In this
size class. Thus, controlling for  enterprise  size, there  Is no conclusive evidence
that  Individual  ejidos are less productive  than private farms.
Policy recommendations
There are major political  constraints  to  tampering with the  Mexican land
reform;  moreover, the  evidence does  not  suggest  that  radical change In land
tenure  would greatly  enhance agricultural growth. However, while the Institutional
differences  between  individual ejidos  and  small private  farms  appear  not  to
generate major ditfferences In Indicators related  to  productivity,  at  the  margin,
ejldatarios  face  more constraints  on  productivity  growth than  private  farmers.
Rather than seeking to  undo the  land reform, policy Initiatives should focus  on
making  piecemeal  knprovements  to  the existing structure.  Specifically,
1.  Granting  of  titles  to ejidatarlos should not be contingent on parcel
size.
2.  The existing drive to  provide ejidatarlos with usufruct  titles  should
be accelerated.8
3.  Holding-size and land-use restrictlons  for  private  farmers should
be skipilf  led and clarified.
4.  There  should be  no  restrictlon  on  renting  or  sharecropping by
ejldatarlos.
S.  Ejldatarbos  should be able to  sell their parcels to other members  of
their  ejido (not  to  outsiders).
6.  Management  of  communal  lands should be knproved.
7.  Credit should be extended directly to  Individual  ejidatarios,  on the
basis of  their  creditworthiness.
8.  The burden of  loan default should not be borne by the whole ejldo.
9.  Credit should be provided wholly In cash and ejidatarlos  should be
free  to  purchase the Inputs and plant the crops  they wish.9
II.  INTRODUCTION
1.  The purpose of  this paper Is to conskier whether the  hstitutional  factors
associated  with the  Mexican  land reform  (1Jkb)  sector  constrain  agrkcultural
growth.  Parthg  from the assumption  that  the ejido may be considered a more or
less fixed eement  of  Mexico's  cuWtural  and politial  scene, the paper wUI  focus  on
the pecomeal changes that  could help to  enhance growth and productivity  within
the  existing structure.
2.  The ejldo  Is  a rural  community,  possessing land and water resources
conferred  upon it  by  the  Mexican government; ejido  members  (ejldatarlos)  have
usufruct  rights over the  land but are prevented by the agrarian reform law from
selling it.  The term "ejido" originally referred  to  communal  lands outside  (at  the
"exit")  of  the  medieval Spanish village;  as  an  institution,  the  ejldo  also  has
antecedents In pro-Columblan  land-holding patterns  (Eckstein,1966:9-13).
3.  There is little  rellable, recent  Information on the extent of  the ejido system
(see Appendix  A). In 1970 (the  last date  for  which systematic farm census data
Is available),  about 60 percent of  farm families  were elidatarlos (Yates,1  981  a:  1  45).
At  that  tkie  there were over  23,000 ejidos In Mexico, possessing 56 percent  of
arable land and accounting for  almost 40 percent of  the combined  value of  crop
and livestock  output  (Yates,1981a:160).
4.  In considering the constraints  posed by the ejido sector  It  Is necessary
to  ask  whether  the  institutional  differences  between  ejldo  enterprlses  and
skmilarly-sized  private  farms give rise  to  significant  variations  in  the  economic
performance of  enterprises  In each tenure  category.  To enhance the  legitimacy
of  the comparison,  references  to  the ejido sector  will focus  on Individual  ejldos:10
those communttles  In which ejido households are each allocated their  own parcel
of  land, this land being worked on an Individual  rather  than a collective  basis. An
ejldo  of  this  typo  Is  offectIvely  a  nucleus  of  separate  household-based
enterprlses;  in  terms of  production  and marketing procedures,  It  has  much In
common  with villages whose inhabitants are small  private  landowners.
5.  In 1981, 58 percent of  the parcels In Individual  ojldos occupied an area of
five hoctaros  or  ess; the average size of  each parcel was seven hectars.  hI the-
private  farm  sector,  56  percent  of  enterprises  covered  no  more than  fIve
hectares  while the average farm size was 74  hectares  (Table 1). Thus, although
there  lb roughly the  same proportlon  of  small enterprises  In both  sectors,  large
private  farms are much bigger on average (In terms of  area occupied) than  the
largest  parcels In the ejldo sector:  most of  the  giant cattle  ranches are private
farms, not  ejidos.
6.  There are a small number  of  collective  ejidos  where the  land Is worked In
large,  centrally-managed units  with each ejido  household being assigned a work
quota.  The Echeverria  government (1970-76)  created  about  5,000  collective
ejidos but, partly because these were "legislated Into existence from above", they
met with considerable peasant resistance  (Barkin,1977). There is no reliable data
on  the  number of  collectIve  ejidos  currently  In  operation  (or  the  area  they
occupy);  In 1970, they accounted for  less than  5 percent  of  the  arable land In
the ejldo sector  (Eckstein et  al,1978:36).
7.  The collective  ejldos  are  concentrated  In  the  Laguna region  (which
overlaps parts of  the states  of  Coahulla  and Durango); the Yaqul Valley (Sonora);
Los  Mochis (Slnaloa); and the  state  of  YucatAn (Johnston,1983:235n). It  Is safe
to  conclude that, at  the moment,  the collective ejidos  do not occupy a promInent
place on the Mexican  rural scene: since the Echeverria  administration, the MexIcan11
government  has  shown  no  commitment to  the  principle  of  collectivization
(Montanez,1989).  Therefore, for  the  purposes of  this report,  It  Is not  biportant
that  they be excluded from the analysis.
8.  The land reform sector  (the so-called sector  social) consists  not  only of
ejldos but  also Indigenous communities:  the  latter  are mainly settlements of  Pre-
Cohmblan origin  and  are  less  numerous than  the  ajldos.  This report  will  not
-comment  on the speclfic  constraints  facing the  indigenous communKtles.
Ill.  Historical Background
9.  Throughout the colonial and postcolonlal period of  Mexican  history,  there
was a high level of  concentration In the pattern of  landholding;  following the liberal
reforms of  the mid-nineteenth century  (which  abolished the Inalienability  of  church
property), the process of  concentration accelerated, receiving much  stknulus from
the expansion of  commercial  agriculture  that  occurred under the rule of  Porfirlo
Diaz  (1876-1910).  During the Porfirlato  peasant villages lost much of  thelr  land
to  the expanding  estate  sector and by  1910 the degree of  land concentration In
Mexico  exceeded  that  of any other Latin American  country (Ecksteln et al,1978:17).
10.  Land reform was called for  by  one of  the principal factions  contending for
power In the Mexican  Revolution (1910-20): the peasant Insurgents from the state
of  Morelos, led  by  Zapata (Womack,1969).  Ultinately,  however,  It  was not  the
zapatistas but  liberal-bourgeois  elements that  seized control  of  the  Revolution.
While  this  faction  fully  appreciated the  kmportance of  ensuring peasant support
they remained  largely unconvinced that  agrarian reform might serve as a sultable
foundation for  agricultural growth. During the  period of  regkne formation (1910-
40),  from all sides of  the political  spectrum, "the  peasantry  constituted  a  vital
polltical force";  "All major groups contending for national power therefore  promised12
to  return  communal  lands to  their  traditlonal  owners, less out  of  conviction,  In
some cases, than out  of  political necessity" (Hewitt de Alcintara,1980:23).
11.  The founders of  the modern state  apparatus (notably Calles) halled from
northern  Mexico and were strongly  infiuenced by  the U.S.  pattern  of  agricultural
development: they  felt  that  large  commercial farms,  private  enterprise  and
Increasing  capital  Inputs  were  necessary  for  agricultural  growth,  remaining
unconvinced that  cooperative  organizations  of  small peasant  producers  coUld
either  gonerate  the  marketed  surplus  of  staple  foods  needed  for  urban
industrialization or  effectively  sponsor agricultural  export  growth. In the  1920s,
President Calles envisaged that  the ejido parcel would never constitute  more than
a  partial  subsistence  base  for  a  rural  population primarily dependent for  Its
llvelihood on  wage  earnings:  the  parcel  was  Intended  to  provide  an  Income
supplement  rather  than constitute  a viable farm exterprise (Hansen,1971:107-108;
Johnston,1983:234; Hewitt de Alcantara,1980).
12.  Although the  commitment  to  land reform  was  enshrined In  the  1917
Constitutlon,  significant  redistribution  of  land was delayed until  the  mid-1930s.
During the CArdenas administration (1935-40)  the  land reform sector  more than
doubled in  size  (Table 1). However, It  has  been  argued that  the  government's
objectives were more political than economic: land reform was necessary to  break
the  stranglehold of  regional oligarchles  and to  facilltate  the  centralization  of
power, while simultaneously cementing the  loyaltles  of  the  peasantry  to  the  PRI
regkne  (Hansen,1971;  C6rdova,1974;  Rello,1987).  Therefore, the reform was carried
out  hurriedly and unsystematically wlth little  attention  paid to  the  quality of  the
land endowment or  the  vlability  of  the  size  of  holdings created  (Brannon &
Bakianoff,1984:1133).13
13.  However,  despite the  relative  intensity  of  land reform In the mid-19309,
a significant  number of  the  large estates  were left  Intact.  Guarantees against
expropriation were extended to  many private  cattle  producers.  Also,  It  may be
argued that  cardenista policy went against the grain. Both before  and after  the
Cirdenas  administration skepticism toward  land reform  dominated thinking In the
upper echeons of  government: the spirit  of  Calles  ultimately proved more enduring
than the  spirit of  Cirdenas (Hanson,1971).
14.  After  1940, there was a progressive reconsolidation of  private property,
much of  It  by  persons  well-connected  wlth  the  PRI regime (newcomers to  the
countryside  who were scathingly  referred  to  In  Mexico as  agricultores  nylon
(INEGI,1986:268-268D). This  was  associated  wlth  the  formation of  neolatifundla,
private properties exceeding the holding-size lkmit  prescribed by land reform: these
properties would be nominally  parcelled out among  several different  owners (usually
relatives of  business partners), but would In practice  be operated as a single unit
(Stavenhagen  et  al,1988; Warman,1977).
15.  The commitment  to  land reform was vitlated,  not  only by the  survival of
large private  estates,  but  more significantly by  the  government's orientation  of
public  Investment and agricultural  research toward  the  needs of  large  private
farms rather  than ejidos. Johnston and Kllby (1975) have argued that,  in contrast
to  Taiwan  and Japan (where the  land reform was more thorough going), In Mexico,
the  coexistence of  large and small  farm units  was accompanied  by a government
pollcy  that  gave preference  to  the  former: the  Incompleteness  of  the  agrarian
reform  was compounded  by  a  mscale bias"  In  Input delivery.  The private  farms
benefitted particularly from the huge, reservoir-based  irrigatlon projects  that were
set  up  In  the  north  and  north-west  regions,  regions  that  became the  prime14
contributors  to  the  rapid agricultural growth of  the  19409 and 19509 (Hewitt de
Alcintara,1978;  Wlonczek,1982).
18.  Although the large collective ejidos that  had been established by CArdenas
continued to  absorb significant credit  and Investment resources  the bulk of  the
land reform sector  (consisting  overwhelmingly  of  Individual ejidos)  received only
marginal attention  In  the  period  up  to  1970.  The  sector  was  starved  of
Institutional  credit:  wThe  total  number of  land reform beneficiaries with whom  the
EJldo Bank worked  In  any  given  year  between 1950  and  1970  averaged only
32,000, or  roughly two percent  of  all the  ejidatarlos  In the  country"  (Hewitt de
AlcAntara,1980:30).
17.  The stagnation of  the small-farm sector  (private  farms as well as Individual
ejidos) carried a significant cost. By the early 1970s the agricultural product  had
begun to  grow more slowly than Mexico's population; food  Imports started  to  rise
sharply (Heath,1988; Yrnez Naude,1988).  Slmultaneously,  there was an outbreak of
widespread rural  unrest,  Involving  the  formation  of  peasant  organizations
independent of  the  Natlonal Peasant Confederatlon (CNC),  a  ruling-party  organ
that  served  as  one  of  the  regime's  support  mechanisms.  The  Echeverria
government (1971-76)  responded to  the  twin threats  of  agricultural stagnation
and political agitatlon  by significantly  Increasing the  volume of  public resources
channeled  toward smaliholder  agriculture, particularly  In hitherto-neglected  rainfed
areas. The private,  irrigated  farms of  the north  continued to  soak up a share of
credit and Investment more than proportional to  their  contribution to  crop output
value;  but,  In  relative  terms,  central  and  southern  regions  (where  ralnfed
agriculture prevailed) fared  better  than they had done before  1970 (Goodman  et
al,1985).15
18.  Increased pubilc spending on agriculture  In the  1970s (Cumilnating  in the
ambitkus SAM  programme  of  1980-82)  led to  some knprovement  In crop  output
growth. Taking three-year  averages (to  reduce  the  hnpact of  rainfall  variatlons
between crop  years),  and comparing  equdistant  periods, real  crop  GDP  grew by
only 1  1 percent between 1967-69 and 1973-75; however, from 1973-75 to  1979-
81, growth more than doubled,  rising to  25 percent (World  Bank,1989:74).  However,
the growth-iducing  kmpact of  goverrvnent Input  subsidies was partlfay  undercut
by  a  pricing  policy  that  discrkninated against  the  rural  sector.  Two kmportant
studies have Independently  reached a significant conclusion about 1970-'82 trends:
aithough  total  Inter-sectoral  resource  flows  (transfers  through  the  price
mechanism  added to fiscal transfers  and transfers  via the banking system) showed
a  net  gain for  the countryside, relative price movements  continued to  favour  the
urban rather than the rural sector  (G6mez  Oilver,1984;Goodman  et al,1985:Appendix
A).
19.  In the  late  1970s and early  1980s public spending on  the  agricultural
sector  was  fuelled  significantly  by  the  expansion of  oil  export  revenues  and
overseas  borrowing, a  policy that  was not  sustainable after  1982. Significant
cutbacks  In  Input  subsidies  contributed  to  a  slowing of  agricultural  growth,
although the growth rate  remained  somewhat  higher than It was In the early 1970s:
between 1979-81  and 1985-87,  crop GDP  increased by  13 percent  In real terms
(World  Bank,1989:74).  Post-1985  changes In exchange rate  and pricing policy may
ultinately  stinulate agricultural growth, more than off-setting  the Impact of  cuts
In Input subsidles: It  Is too  early to  draw any concluslons In this respect.
20.  What impact  have these recent  sectoral  trends  had on the ejido? After
1970,  a  larger  share  of  pubiic resowrces were directed  toward the  small-farm
sector  and toward rain-fed  agriculture.  For  example,  irrigatlon  schemes became16
smaller In scale and altered  their  regional focus;  several ejidos  In central  Mexico
benefitted  from tubewell projects.  Essentially, ejidos  benefitted  Incidentally from
a policy switch whose prkme  purpose was to  redress  the  stagnation of  rainfed
agriculture In general. The one ejido-specific  policy of  note was a botched attempt
at collectivizatlon; this met with widespread  peasant resistance and was abandoned
with the  change of  administration In 1978. Both during  the oil  boom and  In the
post-1982  period  of  fiscal  austerity,  agricultural development initiatives  do- not
appear to  have discriminated significantly between ejidos and small  private  farms.
21.  While,  In principle, the Mexican  government has continued to  support  the
agrarian reform, the  impact of  land redistribution  has dropped sharply in recent
decades.  in  terms  of  hectares  distributed,  the  most  active  periods  of  land
redistribution were 1935-40  and 1984-70  (Table 1): more land was redistributed
In the  second of  these periods but  little  of  It was prime cropland and, since the
settlement density was much lower, the number of  reform beneficiaries was less
In 1964-70 than In 1935-40  (respectively, 278,214 and 728,847). Slnce 1976 the
pace of  land reform has slowed considerably.  In 1977-88,  the average area of
land formally redistributed  each year was only 0.8 million  hectares compared to 3.1
millon hectares per year In the previous twelve year period (1965-76);  the mean
number  of  beneficiaries per year fell from 40,351 In 1965-76  to  36,283 In 1977-
84 (INEGI,1986:273).
22.  On various  occasions during  the  past  two  administrations government
ministers  proclaimed  that  there  was  no  more  land  left  to  redistribute
(Baaley,1981:358;  Heath,1985:115). Accordingly, the focus  of  the  agrarlan reform
has shifted  away from handing out  land toward a policy of  encouraging private
sector  Investment In the ejido sector  and "regularizing" the tenure  status  of  all
farmers by ensuring they have adequate title  to  their  land (Heath,1985).17
23.  What Is the current  extent  of  the land reform sector?  By 1988, no less
than 54 percent of national territory  had been affected  by the land refom  (Table
1). However,  only 12-13  percent of  Mexico's territory  (area: 197 mllion hectares)
was under  cultivation  In this  year;  moreover, It  Is  estknated that  the  maxhwum
feasible area for  cropping Is no more than 35 millon hectares or  18 percent  of
the total  land area (Yates,1981a). Thus, even If all the land suitable for  cropping
were put under cultivation,  more than half of  the land In the  ejido-sector  would
remain  In  forests,  rough  grazing  or  shuply devoid  of  productive  use:  this
represents  an  Important  constraint  on  agricultural  growth  and  employment
generatlon within the ejidos.
24.  Focussing on land redistributed  as a proportion  of  the total  area of  each
region,  the  South  Pacific  and  Gulf  are  the  regions  most  affected  by  the
redistributlon:  In each case, 52 percent of  the regional area had been subject  to
reform by 1985 (Tables 2 & 3). The least-affected  region (with 45 percent  of  the
land area In the reform sector)  Is the North Pacific: this Is partly  because, given
the sparsity of  settlement here, there have been few Invasions of  estates  by the
landless. Also, In the  Immediate  aftermath  of  the  Revolutlon, many ruling-party
politicians either  owned or  proceeded  to  acquire large  tracts  of  land In  this
wealthy  agricultural  reglon.  Some authors  maintain that  there  was  a  certain
resistance within the PRI  regime to  carrying out  land reform In the  North Pacific
(Hansen,1  971;  Johnston,1983:235). Writing of  the  so-called  "Sonora dynasty",
Sanderson notes  that  "revolutionary  generals in  the  North, once  in power, had
llttle  Interest  In distributing  the new wealth they acquired" (1984:45).18
IV.  PROBLEMS  WITH  THE  LEGAL  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  FRAMEWORK  OF  THE  LAND  REFORM
25.  Rather than  provido  an account  of  the  legal basis  of  the  Mexcan land
reform (which  has changed  significantly since 1917), or a step-by-step  description
of  the administrative  procoedur by which  ejldos are created, this section will focus
on some of  the  main problems created  by  the  framework as  It  exists  today.  A
detailed account of  the legal and administrative framework and how It evolved may
be found  In Craig (1983),  Diaz Cisneros (1983)  Sanderson (1984)  and Zaragoza
and Maclas  (1980).
26.  Two points  should be borne In mind. First,  the  legal foundation  of  the
Mexican  land reform derived Initially from Article  27 of  the 1917 Constitution which
affirms  that  all land and subsoil  resources  are  ultimately the  property  of  the
nation. While  the  principle of  private  property  ownership Is  conceded the  state
reserves  unto  Itself  the right  to  modify the  existing tenure  pattern  In order  to
ensure a more equltable distributlon of  wealth; to  this end the state  Is authorized
to  expropriate private property  (Zaragoza & Maclas,1980:53-54).
27.  Second, according  to  the  law, the  ejido  is  "an  Institutlon,  formally
constituted  by the federal  government, by which property  Is assigned to  a given
population group; the ejido is a form of  social property;  property rights conferred
on  this  population  group  are  Inalienable, non-transforable  and  may not  be
confiscated;  the property  shall be exploited as an Integrated unit  of  production,
preferably  organized  along collective  lines;  It  shall be  endowed with  executive
powers and function  according to the principles  of  Internal democracy,  cooperation
and self-management" (Zaragoza & Maclas,1980:207).19
28.  Since the rate  of  creation of  now ejidos  has  slowed significantly since
1976 and Is unikely (owing to the unavallability of  approprlate  land) to  pick up in
the  future,  discussion  will  not  focus  on  the  problems associated  with  the
procedure  for  granting land. Instead, It  will consider  two  important respects  In
which the difficultlis  of  Interpreting land reform legislation constitute  a source of
insecurity  for  exbting  ejidatarlos and private  farmers.
(a)  Holding-size speciflcations  and land titles.  The agrarian reform statutes  lay
down holding-size limits for  ejpdos  and private farms. Limits on the size of  private
farms take Into  account variations  In land productivity:  one hectare  of  Irrigated
land Is assumed  equal to  two hectares of  rainfed  land, four  hectares of  pasture
land and eight hectares of  brush or  rough grazing In arid lands. Private farmers
may own a maxinum  area of  100 hectares of  irrigated  land, or  the  equlvalent In
other  types  of  land.  However, there  are  several  exceptions  to  this  rule,
exceptions whose wisdom  has been disputed (e.g. by Yates,1981a).
29.  in the case of  cotton,  properties of  up to  150 hectares of  irrlgated  land
Cor the  equivalent) are allowed.  The likit  Is set  at  300 hectares (irrigated)  If  the
crop  Is vanilla, olives, cocoa, sugar  cane, coffee,  henequ4n, rubber, coconuts,
grapes or  fruit  trees.  There are a number  of  definitional problems  here. it  Is not
clear If  the  category  "fruit  trees"  Includes nuts or  frults  that  grow on  bushes.
Glven that  grapes  are  singled out  for  special treatment,  why not  strawberries
also?  Finally, It  Is not  apparent  whether all  forms of  sisal  fall  wlthin the  300
hectare  linit, or  Just henequdn (Yates,1981a:177).
30.  in the case of  cattle  ranches, the  coing  Is calculated according to  the
land area needed to  support  500 head of  cattle  or an equivalent number  of  small
livestock. There is some  ambiguity here because, In the  1971 ammendments  to  the
reform law, reference  is made  not  only to  the  500-head standard but  also to  a20
ceiling of  800 hectares for  cattle  ranches In areas of  poor-quallty  pasture. The
two speclfications  are mutually Inconsistent  because It  Is  impossible to  support
500 head of  cattle  on 800 hectares of  the poorest-quallty  grazing land. Also, the
equivalences between head  of  cattle  and  head of  sheep, pigs  and  goats  Is
nowhere Indicated (Yates,1981a:178).
31.  Finally, It Is not clear what Is the maxlnum  area of  a cattle  ranch that may
be devoted to  crop cultivation without the property  being reclassifled as an arable
farm (and therefore  subject  to  tighter  holding-size  llmits). While  the  legislation
originally  prohibited  stock  rearers  from  growing crops,  the  1981  Agricultural
Development Law sanctioned  "mixed" farming,  failing  however  to  specify  the
acceptable ratio  of  cropland to  grazing land (Sanderson,1984:48).
32.  Effective  enforcement of  these  land-use  and holding-size restrictions
presupposes that  the  government Is  reliably  Informed of  land-use  capabilities
throughout the natlon. Responsibility  for  assessing land productivity  rests  with the
local delegations from the Agrarian Reform Ministry that  are based In each state.
The survey  work that  must be carried out  before  appropriate  holding-size limits
may be specified remains Incomplete. Therefore, in several parts  of  the republic,
the  definitlon  of  what constitutes  an  acceptable  holding size  remains vague.
Moreover, actual enforcement of  these provisions varles widely between regions.
33.  Also, there  Is a significant  loophole In the legislatlon that  explains much
of  the  Inconsistency In the enforcement of  holding-size limits. Changes made to
the land reform law In 1947 permit large estate  owners to obtain legal guarantees
(the right  of  amparo)  that  their  property will not be expropriated for  an Indefinite
period,  pending official  Investigatlon of  the  legitimacy of  their  hold over  land;
during  this  period  the  landowners are  issued with certificates  (certificados  de
Inafectibilidad)  protecting  their propertles from seizure. This protection  Is provided21
by JudIcial  authorities at  the  state  level and has often  served as  a "preemptive
strkoe against the agrarian reform, blocking redistribution before any petitions for
land have actually been bdgd.
34.  The legislation also contains  stipulations  about  the  size  of  parcels  on
individual ejidos: according to  the  Federal Agrarian Reform Law of  1971, parcels
should contain ton hectares of  Irrigated land (or twenty hectares of  rainfed land)
(Sanderson,1984:49).  This law appears to  be honoured In the breach  in 1981, the
average size of  parcels on  Individual ejidos  was 7  hectares.  In most cases, the
ejldo land base has proved too  small to  accommodate  all of  those petitioning for
land In a manner that  Is consistent  with the  rule about  parcel size. Indeed, legal
provision exists  for  the  land to  be parcelled out  In smaller units  than officially
prescribed, when  the ejido  !s formally Inaugurated (Dlaz Clsneros,1983:21).
35.  However,  In some cases ejldatarlos  have failed to  receive formal title  to
their parcels (titulos  parcelarlos) because they are smaller  than the minimum  size
required by the law (Stavenhagen,1975:147).  In 1984, the Agrarian Reform Ministry
announced  that 86 ps,rcent of  the holdings In the ejido sector  lack secure tenure
owing to the absence of  certificates  of  title  (Heath,1985:117).  In relatlon to credit
access,  It  might be  argued  that  the  absence of  title  to  the  land  Is  not  a
significant obstacle  since ejldo  land may not,  under any circumstances, be used
as  collateral for  securing a loan. However, the  possession of  title  does confer
greater  security of  tenure upon the ejidatarlo, In the context of  his status  within
the  Ejldo.  The ejido  leadership (Comisarlado  Ejldal) has  the  power to  Initiate
procedures  for  dispossessing ejldatarlos  whose parcels  have been left  Idle or
rented  out.  These powers are sometimes  exercised selectively  and arbitrarily.  It
could be argued that the absence of  title  makes It more likely that the  ejidatarlo
may be unfairly  evicted If he falls  foul  of  the  leadership.22
(b)  Control over  the  Identity  of  those working ejido  land.  Formally,  there  are
binmerable restrictions  on the persons eligible to  work ejldo land. The legislation
Is designed to prevent the transfer  of  ejido property  (or hcome darived from this
property)  to  persons other  than the original ejidatarios  or their  descendants. in
this  rospect  the  law  Is  ful  of  contradictions,  lending  Itself  to  selective
intrpretation  and enforcement. Article  77 of  the Reform Law  prohbfts  ejkdaos
from using hired hands as a substitute  for  their  own labour; however, they may
empioy hired workers  as  a supplement to  their  own labour Input, providing they
themselves  are fully  employed  In working the parcel (Zaragoza & Maclas,1980:175).
Sharecropping  Is prohlbited, "except In special circumstances" (Cralg,1983:257):  for
example,  If  the widow of  an ejidatarlo  has no sons of  working age to  work the
land on her oehalf. If attempts are made to rent  or sell the parcel, or If  It Is left
Idle  for  two  years  or  more,  the  land may revert  to  the  community and  be
realiccated to  other  memiers of  the ejldo.
36.  Of  all the  formal restrictions  on land management,  none has generated
more confusion than the provisions that ban the renting out of  ejido parcels. While
all scholars agree that,  In practice,  renting-out  Is widespread  (Yates,1981a:181;
NACLA,1978:18),  there  Is  a lack of  agreement about the  circumstances in whIch
ttis  Is Illegal. Bailey (1981:357),  Craig (1983:257) and Yates (1981a:181) flatly
assert  that renting  Is Illogal. However,  Bartra (1975:143), Van Ghneken (1980:63)
and Zaragoza and  Macias (1980:176)  indicate  that,  "in  special  circumstances",
renting may be permitted under the law.
37.  Foliowing  passage of  the  1971 Federal Agrarian Reform Law, the ban on
renting was modified slightly: '"hile  leasing Is prohibited by Article 55...exceptions
are  granted In Article  76,  which permits parcel  leasing and the  use  of  salaried23
labour. This Is allowed  in those cases where the ejidatarlo  cannot take on certain
tasks  profitably,  even  though  he  might dedicate  his  total  efforts  to  them"
(Bartra,1975:143). Such provisions  give enormous latitude  to  federal  and  local
authorities In deciding whether specific  instances of  renting are permissible;  since
ejidatarios are generally reokctant to admit to  renting (Mummert,1987:532)  It would
appoar that  they thomselves are not  convinced that  the law will back them up.
38.  The restrictlon  on renting means  that  ejido land does not  necemarily  end
up In the  hands of  those with the means and the  vocation to  work It.  Although,
In spite of  the law, renting  Is currently  widespread,  It Is reasonable to argue that,
In the  absence of  any  ban on  leasing, the  Incidence of  this  practice  would be
even greater: there are presumably  a number  of  ejidatarlos (particularly those on
bad terms with the ejldo leadership)  who  are deterred from renting by the prospect
that their  parcels may be confiscated.  Theoretically, restrictions  on leasing would
lead to  subopthnal  use of  land, driving down the average productivity  of  ejidos In
reoation to  private farms.
39.  The situation has been further  complicated  by the Agricultural Development
Law  (1981) which seeks to  promote "production units"  In which  ejidos  and private
producers can jointly  produce staple crops  (Balley,1981:360); the  terms of  this
arrangement were  liberalized by  legislation  In  late  1983,  making the  contract
between ejidatarios  and private  farmers renewable, not  annually as  before,  but
once every three years (Heath,1985:118).
40.  While  the  1981 Agricultural Census sought  to  determine the  number of
these  "mixed" (ejido/private)  production  units,  the  data  (Table  4)  probably
underestkmate  the extent to  which  ejidatarios and private farmers pool resources.
This type of  associatlon admits of  several possibilities. There are probably many
cases  where the  ejidatarlo  supplies his land (and possibly  his labour) while the24
private farmer finances capital Inputs. The law envisages that  the  ejidatarlo  shall
recelve  a share of  the profits  generated  from the association. In practice,  who
Is  to  say  If  he receives  an equal share of  the  profits  or  Is  merely paid the
equivalent of  a rent  for  the  land? The now legislatlon may be Interpreted  as an
kupilcit legalzation of  the  renting out  of  ejido parcels.
41.  On the  other  hand, the  1981  legislation Increases the  powers of  the
Mkttry  of  Agriture  to  seize underutilized  and and farm them out  to  andlee
peasants (Bailey,1981:360). The 1981  Census distngulshes,  for  the  first  time,
between holdings that  are being farmed and those  that  are Idle (Table 5). Thus,
ejidatarlos  who  rent  to  private  farmers  and  perform  no  work  on  the  land
themselves (preferring  to  pursue off-farm  empioyment)  may still  run  the rlsk  of
having their  land taken away from them. Since there  Is no clear-cut  distinction
between renting  out  and sharlng in the  profits  of  a Joint venture  (both  Involve
some payment  to  the ejidatarlo),  the new law lends Itself  to  arbitrary  appilcation:
ajidatarios  have every  reason  to  think  twice  about  collaborating  with  private
farmers, for  fear they may  have their parcels confiscated. This Is another respect
In  which the  law may adversely  affect  the  average  productivity  of  the  ejido
sector,  by  reducing the  transfer  of  land from  less  efficient  to  more efficient
producers.
V. ACCESS  TO LAND  AND  LAND  USE  PATTERNS.
42.  The quality of  land distributed  under the  land reform has deciined since
1940. Before that  year, cropland accounted for  about  20 percent of  all the land
handed out;  4  percent  of  the  total  land distributed  was Irrigated.  However, In
1965-76,  only 8 percent  of  the newly incorporated land was suitable for  crops,25
virtually  none of  It  Irrigated. There was some kIprovement after  1976,  with  14
percent  of  the land added to  the reform sector  being sultable for  cultivation  (2
percent of  all land distrlbuted was Irrigated). Currently, the  total  cropland In the
reform sector  accounts for  14 percent of  the  cumulative land reform area (I.e.
taking  Into  account  all  land  added  to  the  sector  from  1900  to
1984XINEGI,1986:273;  Table 6). Non-crop land comprises forests,  natural pasture,
rough grazing and land that  Is Inappropriate for  any agricultural use.-
43.  The 1981 Agricultural Census Indicates that  the average size of  the ejldo
parcel  was  7.3  hectares;  in  the  crowded states  of  Mexico and  Puebla (both
bordering on the Federal District),  average parcel size was respectively  2.1  and
3.5  hectares.  While  the  average holding size  for  privately-owned  land is  much
larger (73.6 hectares In 1981), Just under 60  percent  of  both  private and ejido
enterprises  operate  small  holdings (up to  5 hectares) (Table 7). "Mlni holdings (2
hectares  or  less)  are  more common  In  the  private  sector  (40  percent  of  all
holdings)  than  In  the  ejido  sector  (31  percent),  suggesting  perhaps  that
inheritance procedures In the  ejldos  (the stipulatlon  that  parcels  be passed on
Intact to  a single heir rather  than divided between several heirs) have acted as
a partial brake on  holding fragmentation.
44.  In 1981, proportionately more land was left  out  of  productlon (idle) In the
private  sector  than  In  the  ejldo  sector  (27  percent  and  15  percent
respectively)(Table 5). However, If the comparison Is restricted  to  enterprises no
larger  than  5 hectares,  the  proportion  of  land left  Idle was the  same for  both
tenure  categories (6 percent).  In 5 states,  more than half of  the land In private
holdings was Idle In 1981; In the ejldo sector,  the same  level of  neglect was true
only for  the  state  of  Sonora (Table 8).26
45.  If  these  figures  are  accurate,  they  depict  a  massive underuse  of
agricultural land by larger farm enterprlses.  In view of  the possibility that Idle land
may be expropriated by the state,  andowners  would surely tend to understate  the
proportion of  tholr holdig  not currently In production. Therefore, the census data
probably underestkuate the amount of  land loft  Idle. On the other hand, If the data
ar  accurate,  they  still  reflect  a  hlgh level  of  underexpoitatlon;  also,  If
ndownr  did own up to  the amount of  land left  out  of  production,  thth would
suggest  that  they  do  not  treat  very  seriusly  the  threat  of  expropriation.
However,  In all probabillty, the data  are not  accurate  (see Appendix  A).
46.  Since the  vast  majority  of  ejidos  are  IndIvIdual  rather  than collective,
there  Is  some justification  for  treating  the  parcel rather  than  the  total  land
endowment  of  the community  as the basic unit of  enterprise. There Is a large gap
between the area formed by summing  all the parcels In Individual  ejidos  (equal to
17 percent  of  land In holdings) and the  area covered by  the whol  ejido sector
(ust  over  half  the land In holdings) (Table 8). This gap corresponds prknarlly to
the communal  lands  of  Individual  ejidos; the collective ejidos contribute  to a lesser
degree.
47.  The considerable amount of  land tied  up  In  communal  areas  raises
kmportant policy Issues: If'this  land were poorly managed  It  would greatly reduce
the  overall productivity  of  the ejido  sector  In relation  to  private farms. From a
crop output  perspective poor management  Is probably not a slgniftcant constraint
since much communal  land Is  steeply sioping with poor soils and and lknited crop
potential:  even  If  management  were  significantly  kmproved the  kmpact on  crop
output  would probably be lklited.
48.  However, the  returns  resulting  from hmproved  management  of  communal
forest  and rough  grazing land would probably be considerable. At  the moment,27
forests  are mined  Indiscriminately  both for  commercial  purposes and for  domestic
heating and cooking fuel.  The potential  for  controlled,  ecologically-responsbie
tilior  extraction  Is underexploited. One of  the prkne purposes of  the Agrcuitural
Devoepment Law (1981)  was  to  use  joint  ventures  between ejidos  and  the
private sector  to  Increase the efficiency  of  forestry  activitlis:  "although three-
quarters  of  forest  property  Is In the  hands of  ejldos  they  contributo  only  17
percent  to  the output  of  forest  products;  In contrast,  private enterprise  owns
20 percont of  forest  property  and accounts for  65 percent of forest  production
(Excdisior,19&20  March,1984).
49.  Resource depletion from overgrazing  Is  also a  serious  problem. Yates
Indicates that  In 1970 the  available grassland per  "herblvorous  anknal  unit"  was
roughly half  as  much in the  ejido  sector  as  in  the  private  sector  (1981a:94).
However, Yates Is referring  to  the  private  and ejido  sectors  as a whole: If  the
comparison  were restricted  to small farms In each sector  there was probably less
overgrazing In the ejidos  (because, unlike small private  farmers, ejidatarios  have
access to  communal  grazing land).
50.  Between 1970 and 1981, the cattle  herd In the ejido sector  Increased by
61 percent (compared  to  only 8 percent  In the private dector);  the area per head
of  cattle  (total  area, not  grassland) declined from 17.3 to  13.3 hectares  In the
ejldo sector.  The ejidatarlo's  reliance on communal  pastures Is reflected  in Table
9 which shows the proportlon  of  the holding In different  types  of  land use: only
14 percent  of  the  ejido  parcel Is occupied by  natural  pasture  compared to  37
percent  In the case of  private  holdings.
51.  Both In terms of  total  herdsize and the  number  of  purebred cattle  the
private farms control  more head than the ejido sector.  However,  on farms up to
five hectares the mean  number  of  cattle  per enterprise was roughly the same for28
both ejido and private enterprises In 1981 (Table 10). This means that,  focussing
on comparably  sized farms, there appears to be no signlficant difference  between
tenure  categories in wealth terms.
52.  There Is  no significant  difference  in  the  proportion  of  cropland under
fallow between tenure  categories  (16 percent  and 17 percent  respectively,  for
private  and ejido enterprises).  However, a much larger  proportion  of  the land in
private enterprises  has no  defined use  (13 percent  compared to  3 percent  for
ejidos). suggesting a lower intensity of  agricultural exploitation. If the comparison
Is limited  to small  farms (not exceeding fIve hectares), the ejidos also have a lower
proportion  of  land with no defined use, but  the  gap between tenure  categories
Is  less  significant  (4  percent  and 1  percent  undefined, for  private  farms and
ejidos respectively)  (Table 9).
53.  Only to a limited extent may this difference  In the level of  exploitatlon be
accounted  for  by  variations  In  average  land quality  between  the  two  tenure
categories.  Access  to  Irrigation  no  longer  varies  significantly  between tenure
categories  (Table 11).  In the  case  of  enterprlses  up  to  five  hectares,  elido
parcels are slightly better  served than private parcels  (respectively  18 percent
and 13 percent were irrigated). This Is a significant change on 1970 when  private
enterprises  up  to  five  hectares  had more priveleged access  to  Irrigation:  24
percent of  arable land Irrigated compared  to  15 percent  In the case of  the ejido
sector.
54.  There are  considerable variations between regions In the  proportion  of
cropland under Irrigation (Table 12). In the  Gulf and South Pacific reglons where
low and  erratic  rainfall  Is  less  of  a  constraint,  under  five  percent  of  ejido
cropland Is Irrigated. In the North Pacific region, where the climate Is so arid that
Irrigatlon Is Indispensable,  the  private sector  Is much better  served by  irrigation29
than the ejido  sector:  respectively  60  percent  and 46  percent  was irrigated  in
1981. Betwoon 1970 and 1981 the proportion of  cropland under Irrigation actually
declhed (for  both ejidos and private farms) in the North Pacific and North regions.
hI the  Contre, the  proportion  of  land Irrigated  grow  in the  case of  ejidos,  but
shrank In the  case of  private  farms. This marks an  kmportant reversal  of  pro-
1970 trends  (Wionczek,1982).
55.  At a natikoie  level, there is not  a silgnificant difference  In the croppng
patterns  of  the  private  and ojido  sectors:  in  both cases, the  three  crops  that
cover the  largest  area are respectively maize,  beans and sorghum (Table 13). In
1981, these crops accounted for  75 percent  of  the  area harvested In the case
of  private holdings and 84 percent  In the case of  the ejido sector.  The cropping
pattern  Is  less  diversified  on  ejidos  and,  In the  aggregate,  generates  lower
revenue per hectare  than the private farms. The lower level of  diversification  may
partly reflect  the state credit bank's control over the cropping pattern: producers
working with Banrural (three-quarters  of  whom  are ejldatarlos) have less freedom
of  choice over  the crops  they cultivate.
VI. LABOUR  ORGANIZATION  AND EMPLOYMENT
58.  In general, there Is little  or  no difference  In  mployment  patterns  between
Wxdlvidual  ejidos  and villages  consisting  of  small private  landowners: the  ejido
leadership has no Influence on the  amount of  work that  households perform on
their  individual parcels and the  amount of  work  performed by  collective  labour
gangs,  at  the  behest  of  the  Comisarlado, (e.g.  maintenance of  communal
Infrastructure)  tends to  be limited.30
57.  According  to  the  1981  census,  In  individual ejidos,  50  percent  of
jildatarlos employ casual wage labour  at  some tkne In the  crop  cycle. However,
these data shed no light on the number ot  days per year  durkn  which labour is
hired In (hiring-in Is usually restricted  to  seasonal peaks, particularly harvesting).
The same source  Indicates that  only  6  percent  of  ajidatarlos  are  Involved In
cooperative  forms  of  production  with  other  households  (Table  15).  This  Is
undoubtedly a gross underestimate and may reflect  a tendency for  ojkdataros to
conceal practices  whose legality  Is  In doubt.  The data  almost certainly  fall  to
reflect  the frequency of  sharecropping arrangements  among  ejldatarlos,  a practice
that case-study  evidence Indicates to  be widespread  (Flnkler,1978; Gregory,1986;
Mummort,1  987).
58.  Finally, the  available labour  use  data  are  of  Iklited  use  because they
refer  only to  labour employed  on the farm: they provide no way of  assessing the
role of  off-farm  employment  In the total  labour profile  of  the ejido household.
59.  In all ejldos, the  employment  pattern  Is highly diversified.  Diversity  Is a
response to three circumstances.  First, there Is considerable  wealth differentiation
within the ejldo, Initially a consequence of  the differences  In parcel size and land
quality: latecomers to  the  ejido  are  generally  worst  off  In terms of  resource
endowment.
60.  Second, the  majority of  ejldatarlos  In Mexico control  too  little  land to
depend entirely on this as a source of  Income:  they are obliged to  look for  off-
farm  work,  either  as  casual  agricultural  labourers  or  In  the  urban  sector
(particularly  In  construction).  In  one  study,  conducted  In  the  1960s,  It  was
calculated  that  84  percent  of  all  ejido  plots  were  too  small to  provide  full
employment  and  an adequate Income for  a  peasant  family; the  proportion  was
roughly  the  same (85  percent)  among private  farms  (Stavenhagen,1975:146).31
61.  Recourse to  off-ftam  work  has been further  encouraged by  urban real
wage  trends  which  (until recently  at least) have been more favourable than trends
in  the  farm-gate  prkces of  crop  staples  (Graph 1). Moreover,  since  only  14
prcent  of  the  land  in  the  reform  sector  Is  suitable  for  cultivation
(INEGI,1986:273),  the  agricultural  employment capacity  of  the  ejido  sector  Is
severely constrainod.
62.  Third, there  Is an inbuilt employment  problem  In the  ejido sector  because
only one child Is permtted  to  inherit the family parcel: the dispossessed younger
sons  and daughters have to  seek alternative  employment.  Some  of  this  surplus
labour has been absorbed by agroindustrial activities conducted at the ejldo level;
agroindustries (e.g. cotton  ginning or  henequ4n defibratlon)  are most developed
on the  collective  ejidos  (Wllkle,1971).  The fierce  competition for  jobs  has often
resulted  In overmanning  and the appearance of  "phantom  workers" on the payroll
of  collective  ejidos  (Brannon &  Baklanoff,1984).  Generally, however,  on  both
indIvidual  and collective ejidos, children falling to Inherit a usufruct  title  must seek
work outside  the ejido sector.
63.  This Is kmportant because It means that  most ejldo households have one
or more members  engaged In off-farm  work, frequently  Involving temporary (often
seasonal) migration. Migration leads to  the  develpment  of  a family network that
links even the most remote rural areas to  metropolitan centres  in Mexico and to
the  U.S. labour  market.  The development of  such  a  network  makes migratlon
progressively  easier  by  providing  new migrants with  places to  stay,  emotonal
support  and informatlon about  Jobs. Rural outmigratlon Is offset  to  some degree
by  return  migration; moreover, those  who move permanently to  the  towns often
contrive,  via  the  urban-rural  kin  network,  to  retaln  a  toehold  on  the  land
(Arizpe,1  981  ).32
64.  In his study  of  an ejido in Mexico state,  De Walt (1979:220-222)  found
that 85 percent of  the ejidatarlos had worked In neighbouring  Mexico Clty at least
once, usually on a seasonal basis; moreover, 72 percent of  ejido members  had at
least  one child  living In the  capital city.  Both  De Walt (1979:221)  and Roberts
(1982:310)-the  latter  writing on ejidos In the BaJio region-report  the absence
of  a  signifcant  correlatlon  between  mlgration  and  wealth:  specifically,  the
propensity of  ejidatarios to  engage in off-farm  work does not vary inversely with
farm Income.
65.  The kIportance  that  farmers attach  to  off-farm  works  helps to  explain
why farms are tending to  employ  less labour per hectare. In the 19709 there was
a significant  expansion In the number of  enterprises  using tractors;  the  growth
rate  was higher In the  ejido sector  than the private  sector,  to  compensate for
the  relative  scarcity  of  tractors  In  the  elido  sector  before  1970  (G6mez
Oliver,1984; SPP-UNIDO,1986).  Between 1970 and 1981, the share of  cattle  used
as  work  ankials  halved  for  both  the  ejido  and  private  sectors  (Table  18),
reflecting  the substitution  of  tractors  for  ploughing, cultivation  and carting.
66.  In the same period, there was an expansion of  livestock  activities  and a
move toward less labour intensive crops (notably sorghum), trends  that  were as
marked for  small as  large  farmers  (CIMMYT,1974:7;  Norton,1987).  Government
programmes  whose  purpose was to promote small-farmer adoptlon of higher-yielding
maize  varieties  encountered  some  resistance  to  the  Introduction  of  new
technologles Involving higher labour Inputs per hectare: It  has been argued that
this resistance reflects  farmers' calculations that  they may earn more In off-farm
than In on-farm work (Villa Issa,1977:216; Redciift,1983).
67.  The tendency for  farmwork to  employ  less labour per hectare means that
there Is reduced opportunity  for  ejldatarios  to  supplement  thelr  farm Incomes  by33
working as  casual day labourers for  other  farmers: there  has been a decline In
th  employment  of  hired hands In agriculture  (Gregory,1986). A recent  study  of
an eldo In Michoacin demonstrated that only 9 percent of  farmers hired in labour:
increased use  of  tractors  had  reduced  the  need  to  hire  In  labour;  also,
households  with insufficient  family labour to carry out  farm work usually prefetrred
to enter Into sharerop  arrangaments  with "labour-surphks  households,  rather  than
eploy  wage workors (Mummrt,1987). Comparing  this study with a  t956  study  of
the  same ejido (Frledrlch,1970). It  Is clear that  there  has been a decline in  the
number of  ejidatarlos  mploying  temporary  wage  labourers  and  a  rise  In
sharecropping (Mummert,1987:536).
68.  In the  cash-poor,  high-risk  environment of  most ejidos  sharecropping
makes better  sense for  labour-deficit  households than hiring In wage workers.
Typically, sharecropping entails households  that  are short  of  labour handing over
land to "labour-surplus'  households  wlth the latter  assuming  full responsIbility for
cultivatlon. The two households share the harvest (and the risk  of  crop  fallure)
equally between them. The household supplying land Is  usually responsible  for
supplying  draught anknals,  seed and, In some cases, fertilizer.  In most cases, the
collaborating households  belong to  the same kinship group (Mummert,1987:529).
69.  The labour-surplus, land-deficit  households that  are actively  looking for
land to  work  are  not  necessarily  the  poorer  or  less  powerful  party  to  the
arrangement.  A study of  Irrigated ejidos  In the Mezqultal Valley (Hidalgo)  reveals
that  these households  may be highly entrepreneurial, simultaneously  Involved In a
number of  sharecropping deals.  Thus, "sharecropping provides  an  avenue  for
economic  kIprovement"  (Flnkler,1978:105).
70.  Sharecropping  enhances the labour mobillty  of  ejidatarlos: It  enables them
to  share In the output  of  their  land while freeing  them to  pursue off-farm  work.34
The same effect  Is achieved by the leasing-out  of  ejido parcels, a practice  which
appears to  be at  least as widespread as sharecropping. In Mummort's  study, only
3 percont of  households  admitted to  renting out  their  and but, according to  key
Informants In the  ejido,  no  iess  than  30  percent  of  ejidatarlos  were actually
engaged  in  loashg-out.  In this  ejido,  renting-out  Is  percelved as  a last  resort
because the anmual  rent  received amounts  to  less than the expected valu  of  the
maize  crop  that  wiN  be cultivated  on the rented  land (Mwuert,1987:532).
71.  It  is mainly the  poor who engage In renting-out  because they  cannot
afford  to  sharecrop: In other words, the off-farm  work on which they depend for
survival generates the  Income to  cover  family subsistence but  Is not  sufficient
to  cover  the  Input  purchase  entailed  by  sharecropping.  While sharecrop
arrangements take place primarily between different  households In the same ejido,
rental arrangements  cover the leasing-out  of  ejido land to private farmers as well
as transactions  between ojldatarlos.
72.  Although It  Is kIpossible  to  quantify  the  extent  of  renting-out,  there  Is
a broad concensus that the practice Is so widespread  as to open up an enormous
gap between the formal distributlon of  land between tenure sectors  (as reflected
In the  census  data)  and the  real  control  that  ejidatarlos  and private  farmers
exercise  over  resources  (Reyes  Osorlo  etal.,1974:451;  Zaragoza  &
Maclas,1980:171;  Warman,1977).  One source  esthuates that  the  llegal  renting  of
ojIdo parcels affects  ufrom 50 to  90 percent  of  all ejido land In several Irrlgation
districts  In  Sonora and Sinaloa, and  from  35  to  50  percent  In the  BajIo,  In
Mlchoactn and Jalisco" (Yates,1981a:181). The North American  Congress for  Latin
America  reported  that,  "In Sonora, about  70  percent  of  the  ejidos  are  rented,
especially In the irrlgated areas of  NavaJoa  and the Valle del Yaqul,  while esthiates
for...  Sinaloa range between 40 and 80  percent"  (NACLA,1976:18).35
73.  To concluds, the labour-substituting  trends  In agriulture,  coupled with the
frequency of  leasing and sharecropping, argue strongly  that  the land reform has
not served to  *tbe  the rural population to  the land, but has bon  associated with
an  accelerating process  of  rural  outmigratlon. There  Is  no  Indication that  the
intensity  of  this  process  varies  signiflcantly  between ejidos  and  small private
farms.  The Incidence of  outmigratlon  Is  probably  the  same for  both  tenure
categorles sico  the mean  holding size Is the same, the prevalence of  minfundla
restricting  the scope for  on-farm employment  expansion. On the other  hand, while
average land quality  Is now roughly  the  same for  ejido  and small private  farm
sectors,  the proportion of  land left  out  of  agricultural use  Is somewhat  higher In
the case of  small  private  farms (according to  the  1981 census data).
VII. ACCESS  TO CREDIT
74.  Compared  to  small private  farmers, ojldatarios  depend more on  state-
lending  Institutlons  for  credit because the agrarian reform law  prevents  tham  from
mortgaging their  land: since  they  cannot  use  their  parcels  as  collateral  It  Is
difficult  for  them to  secure  loans  from  commercial banks.  The  agricultural
development bank, Banrural (in common  with previous  state  Institutions  that  lent
money to  the  ojidos)  waives the  collateral  requirement  and  exercises  weak
sanctions against loan default. This Is one aspect of  the paternalistic relatonship
between state  banks and ejidatarlos,  a  paternalism that  also  colours  Banrural
loans to  private  farmers.
75.  The agricultural  development bank,  Banrural, accounts  for  about  45
percent  of  total  lending to  agriculture  and Is the main  source of  credit  for  small
farmers In both the  ejido  and the  private  sectors:  about  three-quarters  of  Its36
clients  are ejldatarios and the  credit Banrural extends to  this group amounts to
roughly one-third  of  all loans to  agriculture  (Table 17).
76.  The paternalism Inherent In development  bank lending reflects  an ethos that
has Its  roots  In the  Mexican  land reform: polltical considerations tend to  assume
precedence over  economic ones;  credit,  like  land, Is  used to  buy  the  political
support of  the peasantry rather than primarily  to  enhance  agricultural productivity.
This approach may be traced  back to  the  1926 Act  which first  established an
Institutkonal credit facility  for  the ejidos. According to Reolo  (1987:30), the farmer
groups that  emerged at  this  time as the  prkmary  channels for  state  credit  were
essentlally created by the government and served to  enhance  its powerbase  In the
countryside. The collective ejidos that  were established by C4rdenas In the 1930s
developed  out  of  these  state-implemented  credit  associations  (Hewitt  de
Alcintara,1978:69).
77.  The government operated on the assumption that  peasants were likely to
remain,  first,  poor and, second, averse to adopting new  technology: therefore,  the
state  would likely  remain their  only  source  of  loans and It  would also have to
assume responsibility  for  providing  the  appropriate  Inputs. Little  incentive  was
given  to  peasant  farmers  to  mobilize savings  on  their  own behalf,  nor  little
credence  given  to  their  ability  as  farm managers. This attitude  affected  the
state's  deallngs with both  small  private  farmers and ejldatarlos  and Is alnost  as
widespread  today as  It was In the early period of  the regime.
78.  The negative Impact  of  this paternalistic  approach Is currently  discernible,
first,  In decislons about  the  crop  mix and, second,  In arrangements for  Input
provision.  Banrural exercises considerable Influence over  the  cropping pattern
since  only  certain  crops  (basically, those  In  the  guarantee-price  regime) are
eligible for  financing. The crop  pattern  tends  to  be  less  responsive  to  price37
trends than It would be If the bank allowed  farmers to decide for  themselves what
crops  to  finance  with  the  credit  resources  they  receive.  The  adverse
consequencos of  this  pollcy  are  evident  In  the  collective  ejidos  (which are
essentially managed by  Banrural): In La  Laguna and  the  Yucathn  these  ejidos
conthue  to  monocrop (cotton  and henequen respectively),  despite a progressive
deterioration  In the relative  profitability  of  these crops  (Wlikle,1971;  Brannon &
Baklanoff,1984 L  1987).
79.  Even on the Individual ejidos and among  small  private farmers working with
Banrural, the cropping pattern  is unnecessarily rigid, In the  state  of  Morelos, for
example,  the state's  credit policies (reinforced  by cropping restrictlons  defined by
the land reform law)  obliged ejldatarlos to continue growing  rice  and sugar, despite
the  declining profitability  of  these  crops.  Private  farms  In  the  same regions
(working  with  commercial banks,  not  Banrural)  showed greater  Inclination  to
diversify  (Strlnger,1972).
80.  Second, Inputs sUch as seed, fertilizer  and pesticide are provided In kind
by  Banrural, on  the  assumption that  credit  resources  are  more  likely  to  be
misappropriated  If farmers are given cash with which  to  purchase their own Inputs.
However,  there Is abundant evidence to  Indicate that  farmers often  sell the Inputs
they  receive  from  Banrural, exchanging them for  cash  on  secondary  markets
(Relio,1987:65).  A further  problem arises from Banrural's failure  to  ensure tknely
delivery of  Inputs: famers  frequently  complain  that  fertilizer  and pesticide arrive
too  late  In the crop  cycle to  be fully  effective.
81.  Also, partty In order  to achieve scale economles  In procurement, the Bank
operates  with  a  standardized  Input  package  that  Is  Insensitive  to  regional
variations In Input requirements and prices. These variations are  significant at  a
micro-regional as well as a regional level: no opportunity  Is given to  farmers to38
boost yields by carefully tailoring the Input package to the precise needs of  their
land; no confidence Is placed In their ability to  Identify  these needs. For example,
studies  indlcate  that  farmers  have  little  confidence  In  the  sorghum varieties
supplbed  to  Banrural by the state-owned seed manufacturer, PRONASE;  they often
prefer  to  buy  from commercial  manufacturers,  finding  that  these  seeds  offer
higher yields (Sulrez,1982-83;  Rello,1987:85).
82.  Although in these respects,  ejkdatarios and private  farmers lendng from
Banrural face the same  constraints,  there are two obstacles to credit access that
apply specifically  to  ejidatarlos.  First,  unlike  private  farmers  seeking working-
capital loans from Banrural, ejidatarlos cannot make Individual  credit  applications:
credit  Is negotiated  collectively through  the  ejldo leadership. Individuals seeking
credit need the backing of  the leadership and If, for  personal or polltical reasons,
they have a confilct  with the Comisarlado  they may be denied access to credit.  By
the same  token, the political allies or favourites  of  the ejldo leadership may  obtain
preferential  treatment,  irrespective  of  thelr  creditworthiness  or  their  past
repayment record  (Relio,1987:84).
83.  There Is a long tradition  of  ejido leaders being coopted by the banks. This
contributes  to  Infighting within the  ejido,  causing many ejidatarios  to  feel  little
Identification with the  ejldo  as  a  whole and making them disinclined to  adopt  a
cooperative or  responsible attitude  toward the  bank. In many ejidos,  breakaway
factions  have formed: disgruntled with the corruption  of  entrenched leaders who
are In cahoots with bank officlals,  ejldatarios have sought to  establish independent
credit unions. The formatbon  of  such Independent  unions has often  met with brutal
repression because they threaten  the power base of  local leaders (Wikie,1970).
84.  Second, If  some ejidatarios  fall  to  repay  their  loans at  the end of  the
crop cycle, the bank may respond by refusing  to extend fresh credit  to  the ejido39
as a whole: thus, the  actions of  an Insolvent minority may harm the interests  of
more creditworthy  individuals with a  good repayment record  (Rello,1987:84). The
bank may feel  that  defaulters  are more likely to  pay  up If  faced  with pressure
from  angry  peers  who have been cut  off  from credit.  However, experience in
various countries  demonstrates that  effective  pressure Is only brought to  bear
when  the  group Is small  and tightly  knit  (Adams  & Vogel,1986).
85.  in this  respoet,  the  ejldo  Is  often  an  Inappropriate unit  for  credit
alocation  purposes. The members  of  an ejido do not in most cases work together
on a cooperative basis, either for production or marketing  purposes. The frequent
renting out of  parcels to  outsiders and the high absenteelsm  of  ejidatarlos (owing
to  temporary  migration) help  to  undermine solidarity  between  ejido  members.
Moreover, group solidarity Is likely to be diluted by  the sheer size of  most ejido
coumunitles and the cilentelist  policies often  pursued by the ejido  leadership.
88.  This helps to  explain the lack of  credit discipline in state-bank  lending to
3Jidatars.  The only sanction that  Banrural may bring to  bear on ejidatarios who
fal  to  repay  their  ioans is to  deny them further  credit:  they cannot seize their
assets  and In many cases  there  Is no  crop  to  seize either.  This Increases the
likelihood of  Individual default.  Glven that  these Individual  cases of  default  make
It  likely that  the  whole ejido will be  cut  of f  from credit  In the  next crop  cycle,
there Is  ittle  incentive for  the solvent to  repay their  ioans. A recent  survey  of
rural financial markets concludes that  "the  most kmportant factors  In determining
whether a loan  was likely to  be delinquent were those related  to  the borrower's
assessment of  the  probability of  obtaining a new, larger loan In the future  on a
thiely  basis" (Adams  & Vogel,1986:483); even the most creditworthy ejidatario  is
likely to  have low expectations in this respect.40
87.  The likelihood of  individual default  Is further  Wicreased by  the  tendency
of  Banrurai to  spread credit  resources  too  thinly: rather  than restricting  crodit
to  producers with productive potential Banrural Is obliged, for  political and social
welfare reasons, to  operate with a large number  of  poor  farmers. Partly because
It  continues  to  finance  a  large  number of  marginal producers,  Banrural  has
responded  to  post-1981  resource  constraints  by  reducing  Its  long-term
inveent  lendhg to  a much greater  extent  than Its  short-term  working capital
loans: the average volume  of  Investment loans tell by  58 percent between 1980-
82  and 1986-88,  compared to  20 percent  In the  case of  working-capital  loans
(Table 18). In the  1980s, despite severe funding constraints,  there has been an
Increase In the  proportion  of  land planted to  maize  that  Is covered  by Banrural
credit:  from an  average of  34  percent  of  the  sown area  In  1980-82  to  39
percent  In 1986-88  (Banrural,1989). Since Mexico's  marginal  farmers are primarily
maize  growers these data suggest the extent  to which Banrural loans continue to
t e  directed toward poorer producers (mainly  ejidatarios). In the case of  ejidatarios
(unlike  small  private  farmers),  loan  provision  Is  not  based  on  Individual
creditworthiness, Increasing the  likelihood of  default.
88.  State lending  policy reflects  a confusion between the objective  of  poverty
alleviation (using short-term  credit  as  a transfer  payment) and the objective  of
enhancing agricultural productivity  (Goodman  et  al,1985:71). Hewitt de Alc&ntara
(1978:87-89)  observes  that  the  credit  policy  of  the  development banks  has
fluctuated  between  the  objective  of  providing  for  broad-based  communal
development and the objective  of  restricting  credit  to  those with the means to
repay.  When  the first  of  these objectives  predominates (e.g. In 1980-82),  there
Is an enormous burden placed on the  financial health of  the bank as many loans
are not recovered. Currently, the supply of  fresh  credit Is severely restricted  by41
the  funds  that  have to  be  set  aside to  cover  overdue  loans and to  finance
rescheduling.  The effect  of  spreading credit  too  thinly Is to  lkhit the productivity
of  agricultural credit. While  the problem arises with small farmers I  general, It  is
partcutay  acute In relation to  ejidatarlos.
Vill. THE  EJIDO  MARKETING  SUPPORT  PROGRAM
89.  Partly  in  response  to  rural  social  upheaval In  the  early  1970s,  the
govermnent launched the  Ejldo  Marketing Support  Programme  (PACE) In  1975
(Fox,1986:197). Although originally targetted  at  ejidatarios,  the  programme  was
subsequently expanded  to all small  farmers. Therefore, the problems  described here
are not  a consequence of  institutional  blasses associated with the land reform:
they apply equally to  ejidatarios and private farmers.
90.  PACE  was conceived as a means  of  bolstering the Incomes  of  small-grain
producers by  reducing their  dependence  on  Texpioitative" middlemen  operating at
the village level (Boruconsa,1982:16).  By facilitating  access to  rural  warehouses
owned  or leased by the state  (under the aegis of  Conasupo),  PACE  was intended
to  provide  alternative  marketing channels to  ejidatarlos,  purportedly  makIng It
harder for  middlemen  to  force  low prices on  producers and thus increasing the
effectiveness of  the state's  guarantee price policy. The ultinate objective was to
sthnuWate  output  growth  by  making It  easier  for  small producers  to  generate
savings from  staple  production,  enhancing prospects  for  on-farm  Investment
(Fox.1  986:199).
91.  PACE  focusses  on  basic  grains and akns to  relmburse producers  for
transport  and handling  costs  Incurred in delivering their grain to state warehouses.
The level of  freight  reinbursement Is based on the  distance between warehouse42
and field  and weighted according to  the  quality of  road  access.  Transportation
costs  tend  to  be  significantly  higher on  ungraded roads,  not  only  because of
accelerated  vehicle deprociatlon and  ongor journey  thne, but  also  because on
these  routes  there  Is  much  less  competition  betwoen  freight  handlers
(FoX,1  986:204).
92.  in order  to dicourage  wholesalers from taking  advantage of  this markerhg
subsidy, robdbrsment  Is, In prOcipl,  restricted  to  those delvorhn  ess  than S0
tonnes  of  grain  pr  year  to  the  rural  warehouses. Conasupo lends sacks  to
farmers  to  facilitate  transport  and  handling. The rural  warehouses are  located
within or  close to  an ejido and staffed  by  ejidatarios  nominated  by  the members
of  the  ejido;  Conasupo trains  the  warehouse hands In  book-keeping,  quality
control  and fumigation procedures.
93.  The kIpact  of  this programme  Is partly contlgent upon the extension of  the
rural  warehouse network.  Warehouses  have, for  sound  economic reasons,  been
located primarily In areas where the  largest  grain surpluses are produced. They
tend to  be few and far  between In poorer, more remote regions; yet,  In terms of
PACE  objectives,  It Is In the poorest  areas that  access to  warehouses needs to
be facilltated,  precisely because It Is here that  the middlemen  have the strongest
monopoly  over  marketing and producer Incomes  are most In need of  enhancement.
This contradiction  has never been resolved.
94.  The poor  promotion of  PACE  means that  It  covers  only  a  minority of
producers. Moreover, many  of  those registered  In the programme  do not  actually
participate In It,  preferring  to  sell their  grain to  private  traders.  Less than  10
percent  of  those  who signed up  for  the  programme  In  1975-76  ultbnately sold
grain to  Conasupo  (Fox,1986:200). In 1984-85,  only 16 percent of  the MIchoac&n
producers  registered  In  PACE actively  participated  In  the  programme43
(Heath,1987:278). Admittedly, these  figures  are  not  a  perfect  measure of  the
programme's  kmpact: easier access to Conasupo warehouses  may enable producers
to  lever middlemen  Into paying them an acceptable prico, a benefit  enjoyed both
by  participants and non-partIcipants  In PACE.  However, a further  reason for  low
participation  rates  Is  that,  In  the  absence  of  thuely  credit  facilitles,  some
producers are  driven to  seek loans from middlemen,  committing  their  harvest  In
advance (invariably at  a prico wel  below the official  lovel).
95.  A study  In Zittcuaro,  Michoacgn,  demonstrates that,  even In areas with a
good  warehouse  network  and  excellent  road  access,  most  ejidatarios  are
disinclined to  sell  their  grain  to  the  state.  The quality  controls  operated  by
Conasupo entail payment  deductions for  grain that  Is dirty,  damp  or  pest-ridden.
Ejldatarios argue that  private traders  Impose  less  domanding  product  standards.
A further  objection  concerns the great  expenditure of  time Involved In selilng to
Conasupo  (there  are long queues at the warehouses  In the kmmodlate  aftermath of
the harvest) and producers' understandable preference  for  on-the-spot  payment
In cash.
96.  By and large, In this  area the programme  seemed to  cater  for  producers
with more than  two tonnes to  sell. The author  concludes that  only farmers with
more than two tonnes to  market (a minority of  the farmors In this area) do fInd
It worthwhile to  sell  to  Conasupo. The low level  of  direct  sales  from farmer to
state  Is loss a reflection  of  problematIc  access  to  the warehouses than  It Is a
consequence of  the llmited number  of  farmers producing a significant marketable
surplus  of  maize. This In  turn  Is  attrlbutable  to  low yields  (exacerbated  by
Ineffective  credit  policies) and Inadequate price incentives: these factors  appear
to  pose more fundamental constraints  than  the  nature  of  marketing facilities
(Heath,1  987).44
97.  in the rich agricultural state  of  Chihuahua,  Fox (1986:208-209)  discovered
that  middlemen  evade the  50-tonne  ceiling on  grain sales by making a serls  of
relatively small  deliveries to separate but close-together  warehouses,  solling under
the  names of  clients  and  family members. To conclude,  the  marketing subsidy
operated  by  PACE manifests  the  same contradlctions  as  subsidized  credit
programmes:  It  was Initially designed to  benefit  the  poorest  producers  but  has
ended up providing an unnecessary cushion to  commercial-scale  producers  and
wholesalers, particularly  In those more prosperous agricultural regions where the
warehouse network  is most fully  developed.
IX. COMPARING  THE  PERFORMANCE  OF  EJIDOS  AND  PRIVATE  FARMS.
98.  From the  discussion In the preceding sectlons  It Is  possible to  frame a
number of  hypotheses:
1.  Ejldatarlos  have  less  security  of  tenure  than  private  farmers
because they often  lack usufruct  title  to their land, making  It more
likely that  they may be arbitrarily  evicted; In the event of  eviction
they would receive no compensation  for  improvements  made  to their
holding, thus reducing the  incentive for  on-farm  investment.
2.  Unclear laws conceming the circumstances In which ejldatarlos may
legitinately rent-out  their  land or  engage In sharecropping Inhibit
the transfer  of  land to  the most officient  producers; accordingly,
there  Is  no  process  of  enterprise  concentration  In  the  ejido
sector,  falling  to  offset  the  adverse  impact  of  holding
fragmentation on production.45
3.  Mismanagement  of  communal  land  In  the  ejldos  depresses  the
average productivity  of  this sector  In relation to  private  farms.
4.  Ejidatarlos face greater difficulties  in access to credit than private
famers:  first,  because they  cannot  use  their  land as  collateral,
cutting  them off  from  commercial  bank  loans;  second,  because
lending by  Banrural has to  be arranged thorough Ejldo leadership.
This Introduces a  possibly non-economic element in  the  docision
rogarding credit  alocation.
Hypotheses (1)-(4)  each suggest  that  land productivity  will be  lower on
average  In  the  ejido  sector  than  In  the  private  farm  sector.  There  Is  one
countervailing hypothesis:
S.  Stipulations in the land reform law  concerning holding-size limits and
land use restrictions  are complex  and contradictory:  this makes it
difficult  for  private  farmers to  Judge when  they are contravening
the  law and when they  are  likely  to  face  expropriation;  this  will
reduce  the  Incentive for  large private  farmers to  Invest  In their
land, pulling down the  average productivity  of  the  private  farm
sector  In relation to  the ejido  sector.
99.  There are no recent studies of  the relative productivity  of  the two tenure
catgories:  the avallable  sources are based either on agricultural census data up
to  1970 or pro-1970  case studies. (Appendix  A explains  why data from the  1981
Agricuitural Census does not  lend Itself  to  productivity  comparisons). To assess
the  findings of  the  avallablo studles,  It  Is  necessary  to  understand the  policy
onvironment that  prevalled before  1970.
100.  In the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  dynamic phase of  the  Mexican land
reform (1934-40),  Mexico  experienced impressive  agricultural growth. Many  authors46
(e.g.  Flores,1959  &  1969)  have  argued  that  land  reform,  by  ensuring  more
Intensive cuWtivatlon  of  large tracts  that  wore formerly  Idle, was the  key factor
In this  growth. Between 1940  and 1960, Meoxcan  agriultural  output  rose  at  an
annual average  rate  of  4.6  percent  (compared to  2.7  percent  for  al  Latin
AmericaXEckstohn  et  al,1978:36). Roughly  half  of  this  growth was attributable  to
an extenion  of  the  cultivated  area, the  other  half  to  hcroased  yields (Reyes
Osorbo  et  al,1974:112).
101.  The  nature  of  the  land reform  process  helped to  maxknise  the
contribution that  expropriated estateholders made  to  1940-80  agricultural growth.
"The policy of  leaving owners with generous reserves guaranteed against further
expropriation transformed, on a significant  national scale, a class of  owners of
very large traditionalist  latifundla, Into a group suddenly reduced In their  holdings
but still able to  muster substantial resources and recover  their economic  position
by huprovement  In their farming methods. The shock of  expropriation would surely
provide a now incentive for  them to  attempt to  do this;  and the growth In output
resulted In large measure from Just this kind of  Innovation by larger landholders"
(Eckstein et  al1978:39).  In conclusion, "the  landowners'  reserves  policy probably
raised agricultural output  In the longer  run; while the creation of  small  ejido family
farms increased food production and ejido Incomes  In the short run, but kept them
at  a very modest rate  of  growth thereafter"  (Eckstein et  al,1978:42).
102.  An important factor  tending to  enhance  the different  growth trajectories
of  ejidos and private farms was the scale-blas that  government pollcy imposed  on
the delivery of subsidized capital Inputs: this bias favoured the large private farms
and the collective ejidos, reflecting  a government convictlon that  large units were
Intrinsically  more efficient.  Johnston and Kilby (1975) have referred  to the dualistic
or "bbnodal"  structure  that  government policy Induced In MexIcan  agriculture: large47
commercial  farms (centred on the Irrigation districts)  generated rapid agricultural
growth; these coexisted with a subsistence sector  of  low growth and Increasing
poverty,  consistng  of  small  farms in the ejido and private sectors  (contred on the
rain-fed  agricultural regions).
103.  Agrkiutural  credit  subsidies, public Investment (notably In irrgation  and
roads) and  gre.n  revokution  technologies were prkwarily  channeled toward larger
enterprbse (Hewitt de Alckntara,1  978). In the  1940s and 1950s, the ejldo sector
received respectively only 21 percent  and 22 percent  of  total  agricultural credit
(MueSler,1970:258-257);  yet  Its  share In total  arable land was 44 percent  In 1950
(Yates,1981a:154). In the same  decades the total  area of  ejido land that  received
fertilizer  was  only half that In the private farm sector (Mueller,1970:258).  However,
smail  prtvate farms were not  much  better  off  than ejidos.
104.  To conclude, up until  1970 at  least, private  farms over  five  hectares
remained  more capitalized than  the  ejidos  (both In terms of  working capital and
fixed capital stock)  (Hewitt de Alcant&ra,1978). The large private farms and (to  a
lesser extent,  the collective  ejidos) contributed  a disproportionately large share
of  farm  production  and  agricultural  output  growth  up  to  1970  (Eckstein  et
al,1978:38).
(a) The census record.  These trends  would suggest  that  any study  comparing
the  performance of  ejidos and private  farms would surely  point to  the  superior
productivity  of the latter.  However,  the published  works referring  to the pre-1970
perlod reach varying conclusions. Comparisons  between ejldos  and private  farms
that  are  based on  the  census data  have focussed  on  differences  In (a)  crop
yields, (b) labour productivity,  (c) the relationship between purchased  capital Inputs
and output  value and (d) the relationship between an aggregate measure of  land,48
labour  and capital,  and output  value. On each of  these  counts  there  Is  not
complete agreement between the  various  studies  concernIng the  productivity  of
the two tenure  sectors.
105.  Which  Is the most logithnate (or reliable) Indicator of  relative productivity?
Yates (1981b:748-750)  argues  that,  since  the  relative  scarcity  of  land Is now
probably the same  for  both the ejido and the private farm sectors,  It Is logithate
to focus  on land productivity  when  comparing  the performance of the two sectors.
Moreover, the most recent  ovidence suggests that,  comparing  same-size holdings,
there Is no significant varlatIon between tenure categorles In average land quality
(Tables 9 &  10). However, It  has been suggested that,  In the  pre-1970  period,
Institutional  blasses  tended  to  starve  the  Individual ejldos  of  good-quality
(Irrigated) land (Reyes Osorlo et al,1974; Hewitt de Alcintara,1978);  this needs to
be borne In mind  when  assessing the pre-1970  evidence on relative productivity.
106.  Dovring (1970) found  that  the  rates  of  growth of  crop  output  were
about  the  same for  both  sectors  In  the  1950s; referring  to  the  same decade,
Mueller (1970) made  a sknilar fInding, concluding that,  In terms of  output  growth
per  unit  of  total  measured Inputs, ejidos  performed at  least  as  well as  private
farms.
107.  There  Is less  agreement about  relative  crop  yields. Dovring (1970)
concludes that,  In 1960, there was no significant difference  In crop yields between
ejidos, on the one hand, and private farms over  five hectares on the other.  Also
referrlng  to  the  1960 census, Ecksteln and his associates find that,  In terms of
physical crop yields, ejldos are less productive than either small  or  large private
farms. However, In terms of  the  per  hectare  value of  crop  output,  ejldos  are
superior  to  small  private farms and Inferior  to  large private farms, reflecting  the
proportion of  high revenue crops  In the crop mix (1978:Appendix  C,p.1).49
108.  Analysing the  same 1960  census data,  Reyes Osorbo and assoclates
(1974)  derive  opposite  concluslons:  an  examination of  yield  levels  by  state,
controlling  for  differences  In the  access  to  Irrigation  between tenure  sector,
reveals  that,  except  In the case of  wheat, ejidos  have higher land productivity
than large private  farms. A study  by  Pillet (1973)  found  that,  according to  the
1960 census, crop yields were roughly the same In both tenure sectors;  moreover,
the hcrease  In yields between the  1950  and 1960 census was greater  for  the
ejidos than for  large private farms, In spite of  the latter's  higher consumption  of
purchased Inputs.
109.  Studies  comparing the  1960  and  1970  censuses  reach  equally varied
conclusions. Nguyen and Martinez (1979) find that,  In the 1960s, the growth rate
of  output  was considerably greater  for  the  land reform  sector  than  for  the
private  sector;  they attribute  this,  In large part,  to  the substantial  transfer  of
land from the  private to  the ejido  sector  In the  1960s. These authors  find  that
ejidos had lower crop yields than private farms In 1960 and 1970. However,  both
average and marginal returns  to  expenditure on  farm Inputs were found  to  be
considerably higher for  ejidos  than  for  private  farms.  Referring  to  the  1970
census  data  for  the  state  of  Puebla, Soberon-Ferrer  (1986:165)  reaches  a
different  conclusion: he  shows that  small prIvate  farms  obtained  the  highest
average and marginal  product  from land, followed In descending order' by  large
private farms and ejidos.
110.  In terms of  the efficlency of  resource use, studies based on the census
data  up  to  1970  tend  to  agree  that  small farms  (ejido  and private)  are more
efficient  than  large farms. Estimates of  the  relative  efficiency  of  small private
farms and Individual  ejidos vary considerably between studies. Eckstein and others
(1978:Appendix  C,p.1),  Wecksteln  (1970:405) and Van Ginneken  (1980:189-192) find50
that,  hI tms  of  output  per unit of  purchased Input, the smai private  farms were
more efficient  than the ekdos. On the other hand, NgUyen  and Martinez (1979:831)
find  that,  according to  the  1960  and 1970  data,  the  ejldo  sctor  obtained  a
higher crop  output  value  pr  unit  of  capltal  expendture  than  private  farms;
howver,  they  compare ejldos  with private  farm  over  five  hocatares  which bi
arguably not  the most rigorous  test  of  relativo effiency.
111.  Efficiency  estimates place the  ejido  In  more favourable  light  If  the
yardstick  Is  restricted  to  purchased  capital  nputs,  If  relative  efficiency  Is
measured  hI terms of  total  factor  productivity  (land and labour as well as capital),
the ejido performed less well than the small  private  farm in the pre-1970  period.
in particular, relative efficiency  estkiates  are highly sonsitive to the value Imputed
to unromunerated  family labour: If these Inputs are assigned a positive opportunity
cost  (a reasonable assumptlon In  the  light of  Gregory's (1986)  study  on  the
Mexican labour  market),  then  ejidos  emerge as  much lss  officlert  users  of
resources  (Nguyen  &  Martinez,1979:631;  Wockstehi,1970:405). Eckstein  and
assoclates conclude "when total  factor  productivitles  are  compared, the  small
private  farms come out  ahead in all cases. The relative  position of  ejidos  and
large private  farms varies with the Inclusion or exclusion of  owners' family labour
as  an hput cost"  (1978:115).
112.  These  conclusions are based on the assumption  that the census data are
reilabie and convey an accurate  picture  of  trends  hI the  Mexican countryside.
Yates (1  981  a;1981b) provides an Interesting discussion  of  the problems  associated
with  the  census data.  He Indicates one  respect  In which the  census  data  on
outputs and Inputs are likely to be Inaccurate: "The private farmers have a strong
motive (income  tax) for  exaggerated reporting of  expenses, just  as they have for
under-reporting  receipts,  whereas ejidatarios,  enjoying statutory  exemption  from51
Income  tax,  have no such motive. Also, In Irrigation districts,  Inputs on land leased
from ejidatarios  are recorded as  Incurred by  private  farmers while the  outputs,
as we have seen, are credited to  the ejidatarlobs (Yates,1981b:747).
113.  These points are not  entirely convincing. First, Independently of  the tax-
evasion Issue, ejidatarlos may well be as evasive as private  farmers In answering
questions about their  Income,  put to  them by persons clearly associated with the
government: In the  case of  rental  or  sharecrop deals between ejidatarlos,  both
parties  may choose to  understate  the output  from land Involved in these deals
(because the deals are Illegal), leading  to  an understatement of  total  ejldo output;
the evidence (e.g. Mummert,1987)  suggests that  deals between ejldatarlos may well
be as widespread  as deals between ejidatarios  and private  farmers.
114.  Second,  In cases where ejldatarlos rent-out  their land to  private farmers,
Is It always  true  that "outputs ...are credited to  ejidatarlos"?; Yates reasoning may
be  neat  but  reality  Is  often  more mossy. However, there  Is  one  particularly
significant  point  that  may be  derived  from  his  discussion: In  the  context  of
widespread  clandestine leasing of  ejido parcels (coupled with sharecropping), the
formal (de Jura) definition of  the size of  each tenure  sector  bears little  relation
to  the  de  facto  control  over  resources  exercised by  ejidatarios  and  private
farmers. in other  words, apart  from being outdated  (failing to  shed any light on
trends  since  1970),  the  census  data  provide  no  firm  basis  for  reaching
conclusons about  the relative  efficiency  of  ejldos  and private farms.
(b) Case study evidence.  The Laguna cotton-producing  region of  Coahulla  state
was the  site  of  many pre-1970  case studies.  Owing  to  the  relatively  generous
resource  endowment  of  collective  ejidos  In this  zone, It  provided a  "best-case
scenario'  for  evaluating the economic efficiency  of  this sector. Since the Mexican52
government sought to  promote cotton  productlon  on the  collective  ejidos, In La
Laguna ejldatarlos  enjoyed  akmost  as much access to  credit  as  private  farmers
(Eckstein  et  al,1978:61).  Many of  these  studles  were  conducted  under  the
auspices of  the Centro de Investigaciones Agrarlas, a government dependency with
an  kuplicit  brief  to  defend  the  land  reform  (Reyes  Osorlo  et  al,1974;
Ecksteln,1  966).
115.  A  survey  conducted  In  1967  (Eckstein et  al,1978:60-84)  sought  to
distinguish the  effects  of  different  forms  of  land tenure  and  farm scale  on
various measures  of  productivity,  using  a sample  of  208, consisting of  small  and
large  private  farmers,  Individual ejido farmers  and collective  ejido  farmers. The
collective  ejidos  were divided Into  three  groups  according  to  the  Ejldo Bank's
evaluation  of  their creditworthiness:  "good" (15 percent of  all collective  ejidos),
"regular"  (70  percent)  and "bad" (15 percent).  Cotton  yields per hectare  were
found to  be highest on large private farms, followed In descending  order by
"good" ejidos, small  private farms, Individual  ejidos, "regular" ejidos and "bad"
ejldos (Table  19).
116.  The  measurements  of  gross productivity (value of  output per unit of
input expenditure) present  a complex  picture.  The "good" ejidos  rank the highest
In terms  of land  and total factor productivity;  the large private farms  rank highest
In terms of  labour productWity;  and the Individual  ejidos occupy first  place In
terms  of capital productivity. The  least creditworthy  collective  ejidos (the groups
"regular"  and "bad") have the poorest overall record. It Is hard to  draw  any fIrm
conclusion  from these data because they do not  control  very carefully for
variations  In farm scale; this Is a significant  ommission  because  In Mexico  there Is
some  evidence  that  delivery of  subsidized  capital Inputs has been blassed In
favour of  large farms (Cornia,1985).53
117.  However, Eckstein made a  further  study  of  ejldo  efficiency,  this  time
controlling rigorously  for  scale (Eckstein et  al,1978; Table 20 In this  report).  He
surveyed 313 relatively  large,  Irrigated farms In nine regions of  Mexico, ordered
by enterprise size: size Is defined In terms of  the gross  value of  output,  rather
than the  area owned or  controlled. To begin with, the productivity  of  all factors
increases In stop with the scale of  the enterprise, an Interesting finding because
It runs counter  to  much  of  the empirical  evidence about  the efficiency  attributes
of  smali-scale agriculture  In the developing  natlons (Berry & Cline,1979); Mexico's
distinctiveness In this  respect  has been remarked upon by others  (Cornia,1985;
Johnston,1  983:230-231).
118.  Second, within each of  the scale categories, comparing  output  value with
Input value, the ejido performs better  than the private  farm: the gap Is greatest
In the case of  capital productivity  (confirming Interpretations based on the census
data) and total  factor  productivity;  the  superiority  of  the  ejido  sector  Is  less
marked In  the  areas  of  land and  labour  productivity.  These results  are  very
Important because they  demonstrate that,  In Irrigated regions,  enterprise  scale
overshadows tenure  category  as the determining factor  in economic efficiency.
119.  The picture  that  emerges from  these  data  "seems to  be  strongly
contrary  to  trends  In the rain-fed  areas, where ejidos show lower efficiency  than
private  farmers  of  similar  size"  (Eckstein  et  al,1978:83-85).  The  tentative
explanation  offered  Is that, in the irrigation districts,  ejidos had equivalent access
to  credit  and Inputs whereas In rainfed  areas  they  had little  access  to  those
resources; Johnston (1983:237) concurs In this view. Throughout the period 1940-
70  governments considered large,  irrigated  farms  to  be  the  most appropriate
vehicle for rapid agricultural growth (WIonczek,1982);  small  producers In the rainfed
regions were generally starved of  resources  and, given the  specific  constralnts54
on  credit  access  confronting  the  ejldos,  ejidatarlos  probably  fared  marginally
worse than small private farmers.
(c)  Estimating  post-1970  trends.  By  the  early  1970s, agricultural  growth had
slowed  to  the point where It was inferlor  to  the rate  of  growth of  the population;
food  kuports  began  to  rise  sharply  (Heath,1988;  YfLnez  Naudo,1988).
Sbnltaneously, thero  was an outbreak  of  widepread  rural  unrest.  Th1 Mexican
government responded to these developments  by Increasing the flow of  subsidized
state  credit to  the raln-fed  reglons, Introducing a marketing-subsidies programme
for  the ejidos (PACE)  and placing more emphasis  on small-scale irrigatlon schemes
(many  of  these located on the  previously-neglectod  altiplano of  central  Mexico).
Data on regional shares of  national crop  output  value suggest  that,  by the mid-
19809, the  central  and southern  regions (where most ejldos  are  concentrated)
were making a much larger  contribution  than  they had done in the  early  1960s:
betwoen  1949-51  and 1960-62  the Centre's share In crop  revenue fell from 30
percent  to  25 percent; however, between 1980-62  and 1983, the Centre's share
rose  from 25 percent  to  35 percent  (Venezian  & Gamble,1967;  INEGI,1985).
120.  State  subsidies to  tractor  production  led  to  a  significant  growth  In
tractor  use after  1970; one study  Indicates that  the adoption rate was higher for
the ejido sector  than for  private  farms (SPP-UNIDO,1986).  While  there are no data
In the 1981 Agricultural Cansus on the number  of  tractors  by tenure sector  It Is
possible to  Infer the kIportance  of  tractor  use from the proportion of  the cattle
herd employed  as work anknals  (for  ploughing  and carting).  In 1970, 12 percent  of
cattle  In ejidos were used as work animals,  compared  to  4 percent  In the  private
sector;  by  1981, the proportlons  had decilned respectively  to  5  percent  and 2
percent; moreover, on farms up to  five  hectares, the proportion  was the same In55
1981 (9  percentXTabie 18). Therefore,  there  Is  good  reason  to  suppose that
abour productivity  on  Individual ejidos  has  now caught  up  with  that  of  small
private farms (altering the pro-1970  picture when, according to  the census data,
ejidos showed relatively low labour productivity).
121.  Evidence  Is also avaliable to  demonstrate that  individual  ejidos  now have
better  access  to  irrigation  than  they  did  before  1970: according  to  the  1981
cens,  on farms up to  five  hectares,  18 percent  of  ojido cropland--Is irrigated,
compared to  13 percent  In the  case of  private  farms (Table 11). This suggests
that  Individual ejidos  are  no  longer  likely to  have lower crop  yields than  small
private farms. In the case of  maize  (the most widely-grown crop), the proportion
of  the  sown area under Irrigation was roughly the  same for  each tenure  sector
In 1981. Also, In terms of  the proportion  of  the  sown area actually harvested (a
rough guide to  the extent of  crop  loss), ejido farms fared  somewhat  better  than
private farms In 1981 (Table 14). Other land use data from the 1981 census also
suggest  that  Individual  ejido  farms are now unlikely to  be less  productive  than
comparably-sized private  farms: the  former show a higher proportion  of  land In
agricultural use; and the  ratio  of  fallow land to  cropland Is the  same for  both
tenure categories on farms up to  five  hectares (Table 9).  This however may be
due to  the higher proportion  of  Irrigated  land within the ejido sector.
X. CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS
122.  In contemplating  changes to Mexico's land tenure regkne It Is  important  to
consider political as well as economic  constraints:  specifically, It may be unwise to
seek  to  undo the  land reform if  the  economic payoff  from such an Initiative  Is
likely to be small.  Since the mid-1970s, land reform has not been a significant Item56
on  the Mexican  government's policy agenda. However, wlthin the  government and
outside  It,  the  ejido  continues  to  occupy  price  of  place as  a  symbol of  the
Mexican  Revolution  and of  the governmont's commitment  to  the rural poor. Attempts
by the past two admlnistratlons to  facilitate  private sector  Investment In the ejldo
triggered widespread  expressions of  dissent. If the prosent government sought to
make major alterations  to  Mexico's land reform  institutins  It  might encounter
significant resistance;  if  such resistance  were to  place In jeopardy the  present
admnhlstratlon's  programme  of  economic  liberalization, there might well be net  losses
from the attempt  to  undo the  land reform.
123.  More Importantly, the evidence reviewed here suggests that  there  is no
major difference  In the  productivity  of  the  ejido  and private  farm sectors.  The
constraints  on agricultural growth In Mexico  have been more a function  of  price
policy and the nature of  subsidy-allocation, constraints that  are felt  more or less
equally by  small farmers In the  ejido  and private  sectors.  Rather than deslgntng
programmes  speciflcally for  the ejido sector  the major emphasis  should remain on
Improving  Incentives for  farmers generally; In particular,  It Is Important to  ensure
that  the government's price and subsidy policy does not  discriminate against the
rural  sector.
124.  While  the  institutional  differences  between Individual ejidos  and  small
private  farms appear not  to  generate major differences  In indlcators related  to
productivity,  It  Is  likely  that  ejidatarlos  face  more constralnts  on  productivity
growth  than  private  farmers.  Wlthout abollshing the  ejido  It  Is  possible  to
substantially deregulate the sector:  this entails making  plecemeal  Improvements  to
the existing institutlonal  structure  of  land reform.  Specifically,57
1.  The law about the size of  ejido parcels has proved unenforceable
and should be abandoned; granting of  titles  to  ejidatarlos  should
not  be contingent on the  size of  their  parcel.
2.  The existing drive to  provide ejldatarlos wlth titles  to  their  parcels
should  be  accelerated,  In  order  to  provide  them with  maxinum
socurity  of  tenure;
3.  For private farms, holding sizo colliigs  should only vary according
to  land quality, not  according to  the  crop  grown; restrictions  on
the maxinknum  size of  private cattle  ranches should be clarified; the
proportion  of  these ranches that  may be planted to  crops  should
be made clear;  If  the  land reform law Is altered  In this  respect
there will be less basis for  arbitrary  expropriation, favouring higher
output  growth and on-farm  Investment In the private  sector.
4.  EJldatarlos should  be  free  to  enter  Into  leasing or  sharecrop
arrangements  with other ejldatarlos or with private farmers, without
facing  the  risk  of  having their  parcels confiscated;  renting  and
sharecropping may also create  employment  wlthin the  ejido  (since
land-deficit  families that  do not  migrate are able to  work the land
of  those who have migrated); although, In many  cases, renting  and
sharecropping Increase  wealth concentration,  they  may In some
cases  have positive  distributional  effects;  In  any  event,  they
ensure efficient  exploitation of  ejido land by placing It in the hands
of  those with the means  and the vocation  to  work It.
5.  Ejldatarlos should be allowed  to sell their parcels back to the ejido:
as long as sales do not  Involve outsiders  the integrity  of  the ejido
will be preserved; the sale price of  the parcel should compensate58
the ejidatarlo for  kIprovemonts  he has made  to It; recommendatlons
(4)  and (5)  are  conducive to  the  formation of  larger  and more
offclont  units of  enterprise within the ejido sector,  counteracting
the nogative effects  of  parcel fragmentation.
6.  Restrictions on  the use  and management  of  communal  ejido  lands
should be anmnended  to  allow leasing,  private  Investment and joint
ventures;  government will need  to  ftid  an  appropriate  way  of
onforchg  standards concernhg timber  cutting, replanting rates  and
pastoral  carrying  capacity,  In  order  to  avoid  environmental
degradation: It  Is  essential  that  the  qxternal  costs  entailed  by
expWltation of  communal  lands  be  Internalized" (i.e.  borne  by
lndividual  ejidatarlos  and private  Investors),  In order  to  promote
ecologically-responsible forestry  and stock-rearing  activities.
7.  Ejldatarlos should  be permitted to make Individual  or voluntary group
credit applications to  Banrural; the evaluation of  Ioan applications
should be based on creditworthiness criteria;
S.  The burden of  default  should be borne only by the  individuals or
groups responsible for  defaults,  not  by the whole ejido;
9.  All Banrural credit should be provWed In cash with full responsibility
for  Input purchase and delivery being borne by the farmer; farmers
should be free  to  plant whatever crops  they wish with the  credit
they recelve.GRAPH 1.
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TABLE 1: VARIATION  IN THE INTENSITY  OF LAND
REFORM  BY PRESIDENTIAL  TERM, 1900-1988.
Period  Land redistributed  Percent  of  total
(Hectares)  area  redistributed
by  1988
1900-1914  194,495  0.2
1915-1934  11,543,833  11.0
1935-1940  18,786.131  17.9
1941-1946  7,277.697  6.9
1947-1952  4,590,381  4.4
1953-1958  6,056,773  5.8
1959-1964  8,870,430  8.4
1965-1970  24,738,199  23.5
1971-1976  12,773,888  12.1
1977-1982  6,097,005  5.8
1983-1988  4,167,588  . 4.0
TOTAL  105,167,588  4.0
SOURCE:  1900-1982:  SPP-INEGI,  Estadisticos  Hist6ricos  de  Mdxico,  Tomo I, Mexico
D.F., SPP, 1986.1983-1988:  Sexto  Informe Presidenclal,  1988  (Anexo  Estadistico),
Mexico D.F., SPP, 1988.61
TABLE 2:  Proportion  of  Farms In the  Ejido Sector  by  State  and  Region,  1981*
States  and  Regions  EJldo/Total  %
All of  Mexico  63.8
North  Pacific  77.0
Sonora  47.0
Slnaloa  81.0
California  Norte  69.0





Nuevo  Leon  35.7
Tamaulipas  65.0













Mexico City  46.3
Mexico  48.6










Quintana  Roo  87.9
Source:  Agricultural  Census,  1981.
*Refers  to  number of  enterprises,  not  area  occupied.62
TABLE  3:  Extent of  Land Reform
by  Region, 1985
Land Distributed  Total Area  (1)/(2)
(hectares)  (hectares)  (X)
All MexIco  102,876,920  196,718,300  52.3
North Pacific  18,430,252  41,443,700  44.5
North  38,131,949  80,057,800  47.6
South Pacific  12,344,546  23,850,000  51.8
Centre  13,041,635  27,466,900  47.5
Gulf  12,359,717  23,899.900  51.7
Note:  See Table 2 for  list  of  states  comprising each region.
Source:  INEGI,  Estadisticos Hisoricos de Mexico, Tomo I, Mexico D.F., SPP, 1986;
Statistical Abstract  of  Latin America.  Vol. 2C. Table 301.______  ~~~~~~~~63
TABLE  4: Dlstributlon  of  Farm  Enterprises
by  Tenure  Category,  1981.
(a)  Number of  farms
Private  Ejido  Mixed  Total
All  farmn  1,003,374  2,099,038  189,668  3,292,100
Farms  of  5
hectares  or  less  565,846  1,220,058  120,824  1,906,728
(b)  Percent  of  farms  by  tenure  category
Private  Ejldo  Mixed  Total
All  farms  30.5  63.8  5.7  100.0
Farms of  5
hectares  or  less  29.7  64.0  6.3  100.0
(c)  Percent  of  farms  In each  tenure  category  that  occupy  five
hectares  or  less
Private  Ejido  MIxed  Total
56.4  58.1  63.7  57.9
SOURCE:  VI Censos  Agricola-Ganadero  y  EJidal,1981,
(Cuadro  01)  INEGI-SPP:  Mexico D.F., 1988.64
TABLE  5: Proportion of  Land not  In Production
by Tenure Category,  1981.
Private  Ejldo  Mixed
'000  has  %  '000 has  X  '000  has  X
ALL ENTERPRISES
In Production  54,199  73.4  12,975  85.2  2,115  73.1
Not In Pro-
duction  19,662  26.6  2,260  14.8  778  26.9
Total  73,861  100.0  15,235  100.0  2,893  100.0
ENTERPRISES
UP  TO FIVE
HECTARES
In Production  919  93.6  2,778  94.1  259  98.1
Not in Pro-
duction  63  6.4  174  5.9  5  1.9
Total  982  100.0  2,952  100.0  264  100.0
Note  "Not In production" means that  the land was not  put  to  agricultural or  silvicultural use  in
the perlod April-September 1981; this category  Includes enterprises  that  have never  used the
land for  these purposes.
SOURCE:  Same  as Table 465
TABLE 6:  Estkmates of  Area  of  the  Ejido  Sector
DATE/  SOURCE
1970  1970  1981  1982  198S
Census  SRA  Census  SRA  SRA
|  '~~000
Hectares
(a) CROPLAND  12,763  12,511  10,012  14,230  14,380
- rainfed  10,993  10,831  8,339  12,360  12,471
- irrigated  1,760  1,680  1,673  1,870  1,909
(b)  TOTAL AREA
I  (1)  89,724  82,148  na  101,319  102,877
(2)  na  na  16,235  na  na
Key to  (b)  (1)  - Whole ejido  sector;  (2)  '  Sum of  parcels  in individual ejidos;
ndividual ejldos;  na  - Not  available.
SRA - Secretarla  de  Reforma Agraria
Note:
The census  data  for  "Total  area"  are  not  comparable  owing  to  the  different  way  in  which ejido
land  was  measured  In  1970  and  1981;  the  degree  of  comparability  is  greater  In the  case  of
'cropland'  (see  Appendix  A).  wTotal  area"  covers  cropland,  forest,  natural  grazing  and
unproductive  land.  "Cropiand"  includes  sown pasture.
SOURCE:  Agricultural  Census,  1970  & 1981;  INEGI, 1986.66
TABLE 7:  Number of  Farm Enterprises
by  Tenure  Category  1981
Prtvate  Ejldo  Mixed
'000  %  '000  %  '000  %
farms  farms  farms
Holding size  (has)
0-2  398  39.7  647  30.8  66  34.9
3-5  168  16.7  573  27.3  55  29.1
6-20  213  21.2  809  38.5  55  29.1
21-50  101  10.1  58  2.8  8  4.2
51-100  54  5.4  4  0.2  2  1.1
100-1000  58  5.8  9  0.4  3  1.6
1001-2500  6  0.6  *  *  '  *
Over  2500  5  0.5  - -
Total  1003  100.0  2100  100.0  189  100.0
SOURCE:  Same as  Table  1.67
TABLE  8:  States Where  More 25% of  Farms
were "not  In Productlon" In 1981.
Share of  land In holdings
corresponding to  farms
not  In production (%)
Private  EJldo
State
Baja California  94.7  47.1
Baja California Sur  82.9  7.7
Nayarit  na  33.9
Slnaloa  31.2  na
Sonora  42.7  54.9
Coahuila  38.3  28.9
Nuevo Leon  na  26.3
Colima  56.2  na
Guerrero  32.9  36.9
Oaxaca  30.7  na
Campeche  78.8  na
Quintana  Roo  97.3  72.8
Yucatan  29.0  na
na-Share of  farms not  In production less  than 25%.
SOURCE:  Same  as Table 4.68
TABLE 9:  Land  use  by  Tenure  Category,  1981.
Private  EJldo  MIxed
'000  hectares
TOTAL  73,862  15,236  2,892
CuWtivated  8,735  8,279  1,388
Fallow  1,875  1,733  197
Natural  Pasture  27,427  2,154  580
Forest  28,428  2,588  611
Other  9,699  481  138
TOTAL  100.00  100.0  100.00
Cultivated  11.8  54.3  47.9
Fallow  2.3  11.4  8.8
Natural  Pasture  37.1  14.1  19.4
Forest  35.8  17.0  21.1
Other  13.0  3.2  4.8
ENTERPRISES  UP TO
FIVE HECTARES
'000  hectares
TOTAL  982  2,952  265
Cultivated  699  2,294  221
Fallow  69  259  16
Natural  Pasture  93  189  12
Forest  80  172  11
Other  41  38  5
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0
Cultivated  71.2  77.7  83.4
Fallow  7.0  8.8  8.0
Natural  Pasture  9.5  6.4  4.5
Forest  8.1  5.8  4.2
Other  4.2  1.3  1.9
Note:  "EJido"  refers  to  the  aggregate  of  Individual  parcels,  not  to  collective  ejidos  or
communally-worked  areas  of  parcelilzed  ejldos;  "Cultivated"  Includes  planted  pasture;  "Other"
refers  prknarily  to  land  that  Is  not  being  farmed  and/or  Is  Inappropriate  for  agriculture.
SOURCE:  Same as  Table  4.69
TABLE  10:  Number  of  Cattle by  Tenure Category
1970 & 1981




1970  13,003  4,734  na
1981  14,067  7,613  823
Purebred Cattle
1970  1,995  160  na
1981  3,163  620  97
FARMS  UP  TO 5 HECTARES
Total Herd
1970  2,633  na  na
1981  855  2,378  187
Purebred Cattle
1970  124  na  na
1981  88  189  16
SOURCE:  Agricultural Census, 1970 & 1981.70
TABLE  11: Proportion of  Cropland that  Is  Irrigated
by  Tenure Category
Private  Ejldo  Mixed
'000 has  %  '000  has  ' 000 has  X
ALL ENTERPRISES
Irrigated  1,823  16.6  1,878  17.7  219  13B
Unirrlgated  9,133  83.4  8,729  82.3  1,393  86A
Total  10,956  100.0  10,607  100.0  1,612  100D
ENTERPRISES  UP  TO
FIVE  HECTARES
Irrigated  104  13.1  464  17.7  38  158
Unirrigated  687  86.9  2,152  82.3  202  84
Total  791  100.0  2616  100.0  240  1OOD
SOURCE:  Same  as Table 4.71
TABLE  12:  Proportlon of  Cropland under Irrigation by
Region and Tenure Category,  1970 &  1981
Percentages
Ejldo  Private
1970  1981  1970  1981
All Mexico  13.8  17.7  15.5  186.
North Pacific  59.4  45.5  68.8  59.7
North  20.1  17.9  26.7  18.3
South Pacific  3.6  4.0  4.1  4.5
Centre  13.0  21.2  15.6  13.3
Gulf  1.7  2.5  1.1  2.3
Note:  For list  of  states  comprising  each region see Table 2.
SOURCE:  Agricultural Census, 1970 & 198172
TABLE  13: Main  Crops Cultivated In Ejldo
and Private Sector, 1981.
Private  Ejldo
Area Harvested*  5.010  (100.0)  7,203  (100.0)
('000 has.)
Maize  2,456  (49.0)  4,274  (59.3)
Beans  738  (14.7)  1,175  (16.3)
Sorghum  583  (11.6)  581  (8.1)
Wheat  341  (6.8)  271  (3.8)
Safflower  202  (4.0)  168  (2.3)
Soybean  172  (3.4)  166  (2.3)
Other**  518  (10.5)  568  (7.9)
3  Main  crops only (Sum  of  autumn-winter 1980-81  and spring-summer 1981 crop  cycles)
*  Sesame  seed, cotton,  rice, oats,  barley, chickpea, chile pepper, tomato, tobacco.
SOURCE:  Same  as Table 4.73
TABLE  14:  Maize:  Relation of  Sown to  Harvested Area
Private  Ejldo  Mixed
Maize:  1980-1981*
(1)  Sown  area ('000  has)  2,933  4,813  721
(2)  Harvested area ('000  has)  2,456  4,273  - 645
(3)  Percent of  (2)  under irrigation  13.9  14.9  21.7
(4)  (2)/(1)  (X)  83.7  88.8  89.5
*  Refers to  the sum of  two crop  cycles:  Autumn-Winter  (1980-81)  and Spring-Summer  (1981)
SOURCE:  Same  as  Table 4.74
TABLE  15:  Number  of  Farm  Enterprises engaged In
Cooperative forms of  Production
Private  Ejido  Mixed
'000  '000  '000
farms  X  farms  %  farm  %
All enterprises  921  100.0  1958  100.0  184  100.0
Enterprises working
cooperatively
- within kin group  9  1.0  11  0.6  2  1.1
- between kin group  2  0.2  114  5.8  9  4.9
Note "Enterprises working cooperatively" does not Include collective ejidos: It refers  to  all forms
of  work association between different  households, both within the same kin group and between
different  families, where work Is not  remunerated by payment  of  a wage.
SOURCE:  Same  as Table 4.75
TABLE  16:  Proportion of  Cattle Herd used as  Work Anknals
(1)  (2)  (3)
All cattle  Work anknals  (2)/(1)
('000  head)  ('000 head)  (X)
ALL FARMS
Private
1970  13,003  549  4.2
1981  14,067  287  2.0
Ejldo
1970  4,735  562  11.9
1981  7,613  406  5.3
FARMS  UP  TO
5 HECTARES
Private
1970  2,633  258  9.8
1981  855  82  9.6
Ejido
1970  na  na  na
1981  2,378  222  9.3
SOURCE:  Agricultural Census, 1970 & 1981.76
TABLE  17:  Trends In the  Volume  of  Agricultural
Credit, 1983-88
Millions  of
1980 Pesos  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
BANRURAL  BANRURAL  FIRA-SNC  TOTAL
EJldatarlos
1983  42,298  30,020  67,342  109,640
1984  49,489  36.262  77.411  126.900
1985  53,831  40,018  94,616  148,447
1986  50,423  37,913  69,783  120,206
1987  42,045  30,274  49,213  91,258
1988  62,760  46,483  75,352  138,112
Share of  Banrural  Share of  Share of  Banrural
credit  in total  ejidatarlos  In  credit  to  ejidatarlos  in
Agricultural credit  all Banrural credit  total  agricultural credit
(1)J(4) (%)  (2)/(1)(%)  (2)/(4)(%)
1983  38.6  71.0  27.4
1984  33.4  73.3  24.5
1985  36.3  74.3  27.0
1986  41.9  75.2  31.5
1987  46.1  72.0  33.2
1988  45.4  74.1  33.7
SOURCE:  Banrural, Informe de Autoevaktacion Sexenal, 1982-1988,  Mexico D.F., 1989.77
TABLE  18: Agricultural  Credit  Trends  - 1980-88
8ANRURAL  A FIRA: Annual  Lending  and Portfolio
(In  billions  of 1988  Mex8)
BANRURAL  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1986  1988  1987  1988
Balances  at  year-end  1/  6,829  6,641  4,441  3,663  3,922  4,380  3,329  2,774  4,036
I.  Working  Capital  Loans  2,806  3,416  2,209  1,860  2,282  2,847  2,149  1,988  2,996
II.  Investment  Loans  2,824  3,228  2,233  1,702  1,641  1,533  1,180  788  1,039
LOANS  GRANTED  DURING  THE YEAR  V  6,337  6,996  4,802  3,806  4,314  4,093  4.076  8,710  3,943
I.  Working  Capital  Loans  4,060  4,843  3,004  3,061  3,636  4,023  3,499  3,270  3,422
II.  Investment  Loans  1,287  1,362  998  744  779  070  676  434  622
FIRA
Balances  at  year-end  /  3,667  3,616  2,710  2,687  2,983  3,262  2,134  1,886  2,889
I.  Working  Capital  Loans  1,766  1,976  1,811  1,729  2,066  2,113  1,624  1,262  1,732
II.  Investment  Loans  1,881  1,641  1,100  867  928  1,139  010  632  968
NEW  DISCOUNTS  DURING  THE YEAR  V  3,610  3,679  3,464  2,962  3,274  3,700  2,686  2,882  2,689
I. Working  Capital  Loans  1,727  2,010  2,062  1,973  2,266  2,407  1,918  1,762  1,732
II.  Investment  Loans  1,883  1,6d9  1,401  978  2,019  1,208  709  890  968
BANRURAL  &  FIRA
Balances  at  Year-end  9,196  10,167  7,161  6,139  6,905  7,632  6,403  4,869  8,724
I. Working  Capital  Loans  4,612  6,390  3,819  3,680  4,336  4,960  3,873  3,240  4,728
II.  Investment  Loans  4,886  4,767  3,332  2,680  2,689  2.872  1,790  1,419  1,996
NEW  LOANS/DISCOUNTS  DURING  THE YEAR  8,947  9,674  8,260  8,767  7,686  8,398  6,781  6,362  6,632
I. Working  Capital  Loans  6,777  6,653  6,867  6,036  8,790  6,430  6,418  6,038  6,164
II.  Investment  Loans  3,170  2,920  2,399  1,722  1,708  1,969  1,343  1,324  1,478
1/ Portfolio  balances  were  inflated  according  to  the  end-of-year  CPI.78
TABLE  19:  Comparing  the Efficlency of  Ejidos and Private
Farms:  (i) A Survey of  La Laguna, 1967.
individual
1967 Pesos  Private  farms  Ejldatarlos  Collective ejidos
Large  Small  Good  Average  Bad
Gross product
per hectare  7,804  7,977  4,620  8.540  5.100  3,450
Gross product  per
unit of  capital  0.81  1.31  2.51  1.03  0.80  0.95
Gross product
per manday  129  47  43  58  48  31
Total factor
productivity  1.15  1.29  1.24  1.35  0.90  0.65
NOTES:
(I)  N-208 farms; (2)  'Large farms' refers  to  those over  ten  hectares;  'small  farms'  have under
ten  hectares;  (3)  'Good',  'average',  'bad'  refers  to  the  Ejido  Bank's  assessment of  the
creditworthiness  of  the  collective  ejidos  In  the  sample; (4)  Figures  for  private  farms  and
individual ejldatarlos refer  to  Individual  farm operations;  figures  for  the collective  ejidos  refer
to values for  the whole ejldo divided by the number  of  ejldatarlos;  (5) 'Gross product' refers  to
the  value  of  all  farm  production  In  1967:  crops,  livestock,  forestry;  Includes changes  in
inventory;  (6)  'Capital'  refers  to  the  value of  livestock,  equipment  and plantations, excluding
land, but  Including half  the  value of  purchased Inputs (land and equipment  rent,  hired labour,
irrigation  water, fertilizer,  pesticide,  Interest  on  loans) as  an estimate of  working capital; (7)
'Mandays'  excludes hired  labour;  (8)  'Total  factor  productivity'  Is  gross  product  divided by
purchased Inputs plus capital plus an knputed cost  for  owners' family labour.
SOURCE:  Ecksteln et  al (1978), p. 64.79
TABLE  20:  Comparison  of  average  productivity  and  related  values
for  Private  and Ejido  farms  of  three  sizes  in  a sample
from  Irrigated  lands  in  Mexico,  1987
Small  Farms  t/  Medium  Farms  o/  Large  Farms  p/
Private  Ejido  Private  Ejido  Private  Ejido
No.  of Farm  Units  41  122  34  43  78  6
Land  Productivity
Cultivated  land  (hectaros)  7.3  6.0  19.0  13.6  129.8  47.6
Product  per  h-ctsre  (pesos)  2400  2500  3200  4800  7734  8069
Gross  income b/  hectare  (pesos)  673  1267  610  1462  28U6  3813
Capital  Productivity
Capital  per  farm  (1000  pesos)  22  12  111  27  1040  160
Capital  per  hectare  (1000 pesos)  3.4  2.1  656  2.4  8.3  3.7
Product/capital  .68  .93  .47  1.24  .72  1.16
Labor  Productivity
Man-days  per  farm  S/  e88  468  1284  989  8169  3021
Man-days  per  hectare  c/  99  82  70  87  66  69
Product  per  man-day  (pesos)  E/  24  30  46  65  119  116
Total  Factor  Productivity
Product  per  farm  (1000 pesos)  16  14  61  64  969  362
Cross  income b/  per  farm  (1000 pesos)  4.2  7.6  11.6  19.7  369  172
Product  per  total  inputs  J  .89  .98  .80  1.10  1.17  1.44
Product  per  total  Inputs  JI  .96  1.40  .82  1.27  1.18  1.61
Value-added  per  total  inputs  I/  .82  1.05  .46  .80  .89  1.06
*/  Sizo  groups  based on gross  value  of  output  in  pesos:  small  =  6,000  - 25,000;  medium =  26,000  - 100,000;  large  100,000  and  over.
b/ Value  of  product  minus  purchased  Inputs.
c/  Hired  labor  plus  labor  of  owner/ojidatarios.
a,  Inputs  include  those  purchased  plus  inputed  values  for  land  and  owner/ejidatario  labor.
*/  Same  as  d.,  but  excluding  imputed  value  of  owner/ojidatario  labor  from  the  denominator.80
APPENDIX  A
A NOTE  ON THE  DIFFICULTY  OF  INTERPRETING  THE
RESULTS  OF  THE 1981 AGRICULTURAL  CENSUS.
The 1981 AgrIcultural Census Is the most up-to-date  source  of  nationwide
data which explicitly disaggregates by tenure category.  However,  compared to the
1970 Census  (which  has been extensively analysed In the secondary literature)  the
1981  Census provides  a less  than adequatereferent  for  comparing private  and
ejldo  sectors.  There  are  also  a  number of  reasons  why  It  Is  difficult  to
meaninfully  compare the  1970 and 1981 censuses.
First,  the  1981  data  Is  highly  schematic: the  computerized  data  base
containing the census returns  was destroyed In the  1985 Mexico Clty earthquake
and It  was only possible to  derive estinates  based on  a random sample of  10
percent  of  the  original  questlonairres.  The  Information contained  In  the  one
document published Is much less complete than that  of  1970: for  example,  there
Is  no  data  on  crop  output  making It  Impossible  to  compare yields between the
private  and ejido sector.
Second,  the  definitlon  of  holding  sizes  and  land  tenure  categories  Is
substantially different  for  1970 and 1981. In 1970, private  holdings are broken
down by  size  Into  only  two  groups:  propertles  of  five  hectares  or  less  and
properties  larger  than  five  hectares;  In 1981,  farms  (ejldo  parcels  as  well as
private holdings) are classified Into eight holding-size strata.
More kIportantly,  whereas In 1970 data on ejidos  ano comunidades  agrarlas
took  as their unit  of  reference  the whole ejido, In 1981 the unit  of  reference  is
the  Individual parcel within the  ejldo  or  comunidad. This conceptual adjustment
reflects  the prevailing reallty of  the Mexican  land reform sector  where household
enterprises essentially work the land on an Individual  basis, although nominally  they
form  part  of  a  community of  producers.  The  1981  adJustment facilitates
comparlson of  household enterprises  In the ejido and the private  sector.
However,  a major falling of  this approach concerns the excluslon of  collective
ejidos and the communal  areas of  parcellized ejidos: it  Is therefore  kmpossible to
ascertain the total  land base and resource endowment  of  the ejido sector  and Its
proportional  significance  In  relation  to  the  private  sector.  This adjustment  Is
reflected  In the area covered by the census: a mere 91.9 millon hectares In 1981
(roughly 47%  of  national territory),  compared  to  169 miilon hectares In 1960 and
139 mililon  hectares  In 1970.
According to  the  1981  Census only  17  percent  of  the  land In  holdings
corresponds  to  the  ejido  sector.  Statistics  compiled by  the  Agrarian  Reform
Ministry Indicate that  by the end of  1982 51 percent of  the natlonal territory  had
been turned over  to  the reform sector;  this tallies with the  1970 Census results
which Indlcated that  Just  under  half  of  the  area  surveyed  was  in  ejidos  or
comunidades.  In other  words, roughly two-thirds  of  the  ejido  resource  base Is
unaccounted for  In the  1981 census.81
A further  difference  between the  1970  and  1981 Censuses concerns  the
Introduction,  In 1981, of  a new tenure  category  (Mixta) corresponding to  those
farms that  are operated Jointly by ejidatarlos  and private  farmers.  The Inclusion
of  this category  was undoubtedly Influenced by the Ley de Fomento  Agropecuarlo
(1980) which gave legal sanction to  the  association of  farm enterprises from the
private  and  land reform  sectors.  Typically,  ejidatarlos  contribute  land  (and
possibly labour) while the private farmers provide working capital.  It Is not  clear
how, In legal terms, this arrangement differs  from the straightforward renting-out
of  ejido land, a practice  that  Is formally proscribed by  the Agrarian Reform Law.
The renting-out  of  ejido land has been widespread  In Mexico  since the earilest
days of  the land reform. Because It Is Illegal the extent of  this practice  Is akmost
certainly not  fully  reflected  In the new tenure  category, mixta.  According to  the
1981  Census only  6  percent  of  farm enterprises  and  3  percent  of  the  land
surveyed Is ciasslfled as mixta.  It  Is safe  to  assume that  the effective  control
and management  of  land In Mexico  Is concentrated In fewer hands than the Census
data  would suggest  since  large numbers of  ejidatarlos  clandestinely hand over
their  land to  other  producers In exchange for  a money rent,  thus exercising no
Influence over  the use  to  which that  land Is put.82
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